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Introduction
Former Supreme Court Justice Goldberg admonished the
Korematsu legal team: give it up; filing is ill-advised; you hav-
en't a chance.I He made sense. Forty years earlier, the Supreme
Court decided the notorious Korematsu case with seeming fi-
nality.2 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the internment
without charges or trial of 110,000 innocent persons of Japanese
ancestry on the west coast during World War II. Although sharp
criticism followed, the decision stood as a judicial landmark.
What chance did this group of young volunteer attorneys have
in 1983 of persuading a federal district court, first, to vacate
Fred Korematsu's 1942 conviction for refusing to abide by the
military's "civilian exclusion" orders and, second, to lessen the
continuing stigma of the internment through judicial
declaration? 3
The legal team pressed forward, fueled by the discovery of
a cache of Justice and War Department documents revealing
that the government deliberately suppressed evidence and mi-
sled the Supreme Court about military necessity when the Court
considered Korematsu in 1944. 4 The legal team employed a
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Interviews with Dale Minami, lead counsel for the Korematsu legal team (June
26, 1989 and Sept. 16, 1989).
2 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
3 See P. Irons, Justice Long Overdue (1988).
4 See P. Irons, Justice at War (1983); Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited-Correcting
the Injustice of Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for
a Better Accommodation of National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited]. I was a member
of the Korematsu legal team that litigated the coram nobis proceeding.
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rarely used legal vehicle. It filed a petition for a writ of error
coram nobis in January, 1983 seeking to set aside Korematsu's
conviction in light of the government's extreme misconduct in
falsely justifying the internment.5 With strong community sup-
port, the team raised over $60,000 to pay for litigation costs.
The attorneys, most working in small firms and most the chil-
dren of parents who had been interned, collectively volunteered
over $350,000 in litigation time.
The Justice Department defended vigorously. After consid-
erable procedural skirmishing, Korematsu prevailed. The dis-
trict court granted his petition on the merits and vacated his
conviction. Judge Patel of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California found "manifest injustice."
She issued an opinion castigating high level government officials
in the Justice and War Departments for misleading the Supreme
Court by suppressing critical evidence. 6 Other legal teams
achieved similar results in the reopening of Hirabayashi v.
United States7 and Yasui v. United StatesA These decisions
were cathartic for many former internees.
The three coram nobis cases, along with a congressional
commission's 1983 report on the internment, 9 provided the es-
sential impetus for recent government approval of $1.2 billion
in reparations to former internees. Political history has been
rewritten, the judicial system has addressed its own failings, and
America has finally begun to place behind it a tragic episode in
its constitutional history.' 0
5 A writ of coram nobis is an extraordinary writ that operates to correct fundamental
errors or to prevent manifest injustice in criminal proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (holding federal district court
could issue writ of coram nobis to challenge prior conviction when defendant had not
been provided with trial counsel). The writ, like its relative, the writ of habeas corpus,
is civil in nature, and is governed by rules of civil procedure. See generally Yamamoto,
Korematsu Revisited, supra note 4, at 2 n.6.
6 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
7 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987) (reopening Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943)).
11772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985) (reopening Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115
(1943)). See Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note 4, at 19.
9 Report of the Congressional Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment
of Civilians ("CWRIC"), Personal Justice Denied (1983), discussed infra note 381.
10 See Irons, Justice Long Overdue, supra note 3.
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But would Korematsu and the legal team have filed the
coram nobis petition if such litigation posed risks beyond the
stigma of losing and the commitment of countless hours of
volunteer time? What if a clear loss, as initially predicted by
former Justice Goldberg, also meant that Korematsu and his
lawyers would have to pay $200,000 in attorneys' fees as a
sanction? Could they have afforded to litigate boldly? Could
they have afforded to litigate at all? What if a court-annexed
arbitration program had shunted the dispute to private disposi-
tion by an arbitrator without the benefit of discovery, without
the openness and formality of litigation, and without the poten-
tial for a public decision? Ultimately, would the considerable
value of Korematsu's public adjudication have been undercut
by a more efficient dispute resolution system? Recent efficiency
reforms in federal civil procedure raise such pressing questions.
How those reforms serve or disserve values of court access for
minorities is the subject of this Article.
The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on affirma-
tive action," racial harassment, 12 employment discrimination, 3
municipal civil rights immunity 14 and the execution of retarded
people 5 signal an aggressive and broad retreat from minority
I City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny standard of review to city's minority contractor set-aside ordinance and holding
that a generalized finding of discrimination in the entire construction industry cannot
justify minority racial quota).
12 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (declaring racial
harassment in employment is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
13 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 110 S. Ct. 38 (1989) (ruling that Title VII
plaintiff bears both the burden of proving disparate impact and the burden of disproving
the employer's assertion that the adverse employment practice was based solely on a
legitimate neutral consideration); Lorance v. A.T.& T. Technologies, 109 S. Ct. 2261
(1989) (affirming dismissal of female employees' Title VII claim through a restrictive
interpretation of the statute of limitations period for challenging discriminatory seniority
systems).
14 Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989) (expanding scope of
municipal civil rights immunity).
I5 Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (holding eighth amendment does not
categorically forbid execution of mentally retarded); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 109
S. Ct. 2969 (1989) (holding eighth amendment does not forbid the death penalty for
minors age 16 or older).
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liberties.' 6 A maelstrom of public praise and criticism swirls
around the Court's decisions about rights. 17
Far less obvious, and generating far less resistance, has
been a gradual retooling of procedural rules in the name of
systemic efficiency. Efficiency reforms compel private dispute
resolution of "alternative" cases, discourage marginal litigants
through punitive sanctions, require more factual support before
filing, shrink the postfiling information-gathering process and
erect tougher obstacles to juries. They have pared down the
system of public adjudication. 8 Cheaper and quicker resolutions
appear to have benefitted the system and some participants. 19
But serious problems have emerged. First, various indica-
tors suggest that recent federal procedural reforms have subtly
26 See Rehnquist Court Restricting Constitutional Protections, L.A. Times, Feb.
24, 1989, § 1, at 12, col. 1; Now, the Court of Less Resort, U.S. News & World Rep.,
July 17, 1989, at 26; Chipping Away at Civil Rights, Time, June 26, 1989, at 63;
Affirmative Inaction, 48 Pol'y Rev. 32 (Spr. 1989).
Other recent decisions include Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct.
3040 (1989) (affirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but expanding scope of state
regulation of abortion funding); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 109 S.
Ct. 1402 (1989) (upholding program of mandatory drug testing of railroad employees).
But see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (remanding a sexual
discrimination claim and requiring employer to prove nondiscriminatory justification).
See N. Amaker, Civil Rights and the Reagan Administration (1988) (finding the Reagan
administration's civil rights enforcement record weaker than the record of all six pred-
ecessors and documenting opposition to affirmative action and civil liberties initiatives
in housing, employment, education and federally assisted programs); H. Schwartz,
Packing the Courts-The Conservative Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution (1988);
Caplan, The Tenth Justice, New Yorker, Aug. 10, 1987, at 29.
17 Media response has been varied and pointed. See, e.g., The Court is Right to
Stop Pampering Minorities, Newsday, July 3, 1989, at 41; Put tire Brakes On Prejudice,
Newsday (Nassau and Suffolk ed.), July 13, 1989, at 77; Illogical Force: Supreme
Court's Civil Rights Decisions, The Nation, July 10, 1989, at 40. Scholarly writings
about rights are numerous. See infra notes 288-303 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 41-199 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion of
efficiency reforms.
19 1 agree generally with critics of litigation who see some aspects of the system as
generating excessive cost. Unnecessary litigation cost works as leverage against those
with limited resources and thus distorts outcomes. Recent reforms aimed at making the
cost of discovery proportionate to the needs of cases and the resources of parties
generally are positive steps. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). I also agree with critics who
believe the federal litigation system, in its recent past, has sometimes tolerated utterly
careless and abusive filings, that is, those that were not at all thoughtfully conceived or
that were vindictively filed with a desire only to harass. Such filings hurt innocent
parties, drain judicial resources, and diminish public confidence in the legal system.
Procedural reforms specifically designed and carefully implemented to deter such mis-
filings, and only such misfilings, are justifiable. My concern is that recent efficiency
reforms have not been carefully tailored to specific problems and collectively go far
beyond these justifiable limits.
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yet measurably discouraged judicial access for those outside the
political and cultural mainstream, particularly those challenging
accepted legal principles and social norms. 20 The reforms as-
sume and facilitate a procedural system hospitable to litigants
with disputes involving well-settled legal principles. Efficiency
reforms make expendable those raising difficult and often ten-
uous claims that demand the reordering of established political,
economic and social arrangements, that is, those at the system's
and society's margins. Had efficiency reforms been firmly in
place in 1983, they would have deterred the Korematsu legal
team from timely initiating and forcefully litigating the coram
nobis proceeding. 21
Second, formalist notions of efficiency, neutrality and fair-
ness have obscured the cumulative effects and attendant value
judgments of procedural reforms. While the Court's retreat in
civil liberties captures public attention and spurs often ranco-
rous debate, the procedural revolution that is diminishing court
access continues in comparative quiet.
Public scrutiny is essential. Reforms that discourage court
access for minorities asserting "marginal" rights claims reflect
value judgments about the purposes of adjudication and the
desirability of broad-based participation in the litigation pro-
cess. 22 Should procedure discourage adjudication of challenges
to the "unconscious racism" that may underlie "the racially
disproportionate impact of governmental policy"; 23 to the un-
20 See infra notes 86-199 and accompanying text.
21 Minami stated in a recent interview that a risk of Rule 11 sanctions, buttressed
by horror stories such as the Christie Institute debacle, see infra note 139, or a require-
ment of proceeding first through private arbitration, would seriously have altered the
legal team's approach to the litigation and may even have affected its decision to file.
See infra note 335. The Korematsu petition was filed shortly before the institution of
these reforms. Minami stated that, at a minimum, a colorable risk of sanctions would
have delayed filing for a year while the volunteers conducted more research and the
legal team awaited the report of the congressional commission investigating the intern-
ment. The delay, he indicated, would have created severe organizational difficulties for
the litigation team which at any given time was attempting to coordinate the efforts and
sustain the commitment of 50 or more volunteer students and community persons. He
also stated that the one traditional law firm that provided substantial logistical support
for the legal team might have been deterred from providing that essential support if
sanctions had been a risk. Id.
2 See infra notes 200-246 and accompanying text.
2 Lawrence, Ego, Id and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism,
39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 355 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, Unconscious Racism] (sug-
gesting replacement of the "intent" test for unlawful discrimination with a "cultural
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stated assumption of women's "natural" inferiority in the busi-
ness arena that justifies their continued exclusion from high
executive positions;24 to the belief in the immorality and aberr-
ance of homosexual relationships that justifies government reg-
ulation of private matters not otherwise regulable for heterosex-
uals; 25 and to the idea that the first amendment unqualifiedly
protects racist hate speech?26 Today, these challenges are on
the margins of prevailing law. They are not, however, marginal
in social importance.
Consider Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu.27 Man-
uel Fragante is a Filipino American who, as an adult in 1981,
emigrated from the Philippines to Hawaii. At the time that he
emigrated, he spoke English grammatically and coherently, but
with a strong accent.2  After a year he took the civil service
exam in English, scoring the highest of 721 test-takers. He
applied for an entry-level clerical position with the City of Hon-
olulu's Division of Motor Vehicles. Fragante was ranked first
among the short list of eligible candidates. The assistant licen-
sing administrator and the division secretary then conducted a
fifteen-minute interview, following no set procedures. The in-
terviewers noted Frangante's "very pronounced accent which
is difficult to understand. ' 2 9 Although the administrator was
meaning" test that "would evaluate governmental conduct to see ifit conveys a symbolic
message to which the culture attaches racial significance . I... d. at 356).
24 Perhaps the most notable historical example is the challenge to the "natural" law
of social segregation between races that justified the separate-but-equal principle. See
infra notes 336-343 and accompanying text.
25 See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (challenging the consti-
tutionality of Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy).
26 See Borovoy, Mahoney, Brown, Cameron, Goldberger & Matsuda, The James
McCormick Mitchell Lecture-Language As Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Ca-
nadian and American Perspectives on Group Defamation, 37 Buffalo L. Rev. 337 (1988-
89); Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982) (calling for a tort remedy for racist
words); Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989) (calling for public sanctions as a response to racist speech).
27 No. 87-2921 (March 6, 1989), modified, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
- U.S. -. (1990).
28 Fragante's education in the Philippines, including a bachelor of law degree, was
in English. He served an extended term in the military, which included several trips to
the United States, and worked in the private sector as a salesman. In both situations,
English was the primary language spoken. See infra note 30.
" These facts are uncontroverted. See Fragante, 699 F. Supp. 1429, 1431 (D. Haw.
1987); Appellant's Opening Brief; Appellees' Answering Brief; Appellant's Reply Brief;
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing.
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impressed with Fragante's educational and employment history
and although Fragante possessed "extensive verbal communi-
cation skill in English,"30 the administrator did not recommend
hiring Fragante because of his accent. Was this, as asserted by
the city administration, a situation of an applicant failing to meet
a crucial job requirement?
An examination of the social context suggests a deeper
problem. Viewed as a cultural group, Filipinos in Hawaii strug-
gle economically and socially.31 Filipino immigrants speak En-
glish with a heavy accent that is sometimes mocked. 32 Although
some have achieved positions of prominence, Filipinos are un-
derrepresented in civil service government jobs, appointed gov-
ernment positions, and public school teaching. 33 Moreover, ste-
reotypes of the socially unstable and violent-tempered
immigrant Filipino male persist. 34 In this context, Fragante's
problem with city administrators may be viewed as part of a
larger problem of cultural bias underlying government hiring
practices and policies. As evidenced by the administrators' writ-
ten statement, they did not reject Fragante because he was
unable to communicate or because he was unqualified. Instead,
they "would not recommend him ... because of his accent. 35
Fragante believed that he was rejected for two reasons.
First and foremost, he claimed that the interviewers were dis-
comforted by his Filipino accent and thought the public would
feel similarly. Fragante viewed his rejection as a manifestation
of "unconscious racism. '36 Second, he asserted that interview
30 Fragante, 699 F. Supp. at 1431.
3' East-West Population Inst., Filipino Immigrants in Hawaii: A Profile of Recent
Arrivals 4, 5 (July 1985).
32 The only linguist at Fragante's trial testified to this. See Appellant's Opening
Brief, supra note 29, at 12.
33 Id.
34 This stereotype appears to have been revived to an extent by recent media reports
of the emergence of Filipino youth gangs in Hawaii. See Hawaii Youth Gangs a Growing
Problem, Honolulu Advertiser, Feb. 3, 1989, at A4, col. 2; Filipino Gangs A Complex
Problem, Conference Told, Honolulu Advertiser, Aug. 12, 1988, at A7, col. 1.
31 Fragante, 699 F. Supp. at 1431. In late 1983, Fragante accepted employment as
a statistics clerk at the State of Hawaii Department of Labor. His job required that he
conduct surveys and gather information, often over the telephone or through conver-
sations with members of the public. He has continued to work with the Department of
Labor and has been promoted three times. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, at 5 n.2 (Feb. 1990).
3Interview with Fragante (Aug. 24, 1989).
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procedures fostered biased decisions.3 7 Fragante's administra-
tive protest was unavailing. 38 Therefore, he had two options:
grin and bear it, or file suit.
Factual and legal hurdles made Fragante's case a difficult
one in terms of obtaining a favorable judgment. How could he
prove that city administrators denied his application because
they believed his accent would be unacceptable to the main-
stream public, that is, that he was rejected because the public
would not want to listen? Title VII prohibits discrimination on
the basis of national origin and some courts recognize accent
discrimination to be illegal on that basis. Courts, however, also
recognize the "ability to communicate" as a "bona fide occu-
pational qualification."3 9
To succeed, Fragante needed to adopt a legal position based
on a reordering of social understandings. In doing so, he main-
tained that while listener inability to understand his speech
would justify a refusal to hire, listener preference to hear a
familiar accent would not. Fragante's theory was a novel one.
No court had formally recognized it. It embraced an alternative
view of social reality: that mainstream speech preferences may
unjustly define what is "natural" in social interactions.
Are marginal claims such as Fragante's discouraged by
recent efficiency procedural reforms? Should they be? To ad-
dress these questions, Part I of this Article examines recent
reforms at each stage of the litigation process. Part II describes
a framework of traditional procedural values for evaluating ef-
ficiency procedural reforms. That framework reveals trouble-
some aspects of the reforms collectively and indicates that sin-
gle-value efficiency analysis used to justify the reforms is
incomplete.
Parts III and IV suggest that traditional values analysis is
itself incomplete. Traditional values analysis tends to focus nar-
11 Fragante's trial expert on industrial relations testified that the city's interview
rating form was the worst that he had seen in 35 years. Appellant's Opening Brief,
supra note 29, at 36. The district court confirmed the "insufficiencies of the rating
system and the weaknesses of the interview process," but, somewhat illogically, found
no discriminatory application in Fragante's situation. 699 F. Supp. at 1432.38 Fragante's complaint to the State Department of Labor was rejected after a brief
investigation. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 29, at 5.
"1 EEOC Comp. Man. (CCH) 4035 (1986); see also Mejia v. New York Sheraton
Hotel, 459 F. Supp. 375, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (discharge of hotel employee for lack of
English skills held nondiscriminatory).
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rowly on the individual litigant, assume a separation of proce-
dure and substance, accept the essential fairness of facially
neutral procedures, and embrace a primarily private dispute-
resolution purpose of adjudication. This Article offers in its
place a reformulated values framework that better accounts for
minority interests in court access, particularly for those minor-
ities challenging social understandings that inform prevailing
law. The reformulated values framework draws upon traditional
values analysis as well as recent developments in rights and
feminist theories. It acknowledges differential power in group
relations, rejects a clean divide between substance and proce-
dure, dispels the myth of a value-free procedural science, and
recognizes the importance of public values articulation as a
function of adjudication. Measured against this values frame-
work, efficiency reforms can be seen as threatening significant
aspects of our adjudicatory system as well as our system of
democratic governance.
Part V locates the Article's ideas about procedure amidst
the larger debate about rights. It acknowledges criticisms about
rights litigation and rights discourse along with concerns about
"legal utopianism." It nonetheless finds enduring value in ac-
cessible courts for minorities asserting rights as potentially part
of a dynamic process of cultural transformation. Court access
is potential leverage for those without established power or
social status to "assemble, associate and articulate positions
politically on the terrain of civil society," and to thereby partic-
ipate in the debate over "legal and political choices without
pretending a social harmony that does not exist and without
foreclosing social changes as yet unimagined. ' '40
I. Recent Efficiency Procedural Reforms that Diminish
Minority Access to Courts
Commencing in the mid-1970's, and supported by former
Chief Justice Burger's complaints about an overburdened judi-
ciary,41 judges, lawyers and scholars leveled vociferous criticism
40 Cohen, Morality or Sittichkeit: Toward a Post-Hegelian Solution, 10 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1384, 1406 (1989).
41 Burger, Introduction to Symposium: Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, 37
Rutgers L. Rev. 217 (1985).
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at the civil litigation system in the United States. 42 Much of the
criticism focused on overcrowded dockets, excessive cost, de-
lay, waste and insensitivity to human needs. Scholarly criticism
also pointed to failures of the adversary system, including flawed
procedures that encouraged frivolous filings, runaway discov-
ery, and begrudgingly authorized pretrial judicial management
of cases. 43
The perceived flood of "public law" cases commencing in
the late 1960's seemingly exacerbated these problems. 44 "Liti-
gation explosion" and "hyperlexis" surfaced as descriptive
terms simultaneous with criticism of excessive congressional
and judicial zeal in creating new rights. 45
Cries for procedural reform emanated from many camps,
coalescing disparate interest groups. The rallying point-effi-
ciency. Judges wanted fewer, shorter, and less complicated
cases. 46 Plaintiffs' attorneys, including some public interest law
groups, wanted less obstructionism by better-heeled defense
counsel. 47 Defense counsel wanted fewer frivolous plaintiffs'
42 Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 219
(1985); Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. Rev. 767 (1977);
Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1984); Peck-
ham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from
Filing to Disposition, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 770 (1981) [hereinafter, Peckham, Judge as Case
Manager]; Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice and Court Reform: Ex-
amining the Critical Assumptions, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 319 (1985). But see Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4
(1983) [hereinafter Galanter, Landscape].
43 See Yamamoto, Case Management and the Hawaii Courts: The Evolving Role
of the Managerial Judge In Civil Litigation, 9 U. Haw. L. Rev. 395, 398 (1987) [here-
inafter Yamamoto, Case Management].
4See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1281 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Role of the Judge] (discussing the emergence of public
law litigation as a mode of adjudication).
45 Marc Galanter's studies of the "litigation explosion" conclude that this rhetoric
distorted the actual picture. A notable part of the increase in filings was attributable to
government debt collection actions. Many of the supposedly systemwide problems were
evident only in the small percentage of cases that were complex. Much of the criticism
did not address the vast majority of "ordinary" cases. Galanter, The Day After the
Litigation Explosion, 46 Md. L. Rev. 3 (1986) [hereinafter, Galanter, Day After]; see
Galanter, Landscape, supra note 42.
46 See, e.g., Peckham, Judge as Case Manager, supra note 42.
41 See generally Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique
and Proposals for Change, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 1295 (1978) (exploring the thesis that the
adversary character of civil discovery promotes pratices which systematically impede
the principal purpose of discovery, that is, revelation of all relevant facts).
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filings. Political conservatives wanted less public interest liti-
gation.48 The Supreme Court wanted to curb abusive discovery
practices. 49 Congress and a weary public wanted changes that
made litigation cheaper and more responsive to litigant needs.
In response to this "failing faith" in the courts, 50 federal and
state court research centers and the American Bar Association
recommended procedural changes to "reduce cost and delay."'51
As a result of this reform fervor, mediation and court-
annexed arbitration programs were established, removing a vast
array of legal disputes from the litigation system and reducing
costs for participants and courts. Greater managerial authority
was invested in judges, enabling them to control entry into the
system as well as pretrial development of cases. 52 At the prefiling
stage, amended Rule 11 now requires rigorous attorney screen-
ing of claims, defenses, and motions. 3
At the time of fling, judges require heightened fact-pleading
for certain types of difficult and time-consuming cases. "Disfa-
vored" substantive claims must pass a higher threshold for entry
into the system.5 4 After filing, judicial control over discovery
endeavors to make the cost of information-gathering propor-
tionate to the amount in controversy and the needs of the case.55
48 See R. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform (1985) [hereinafter Posner,
Federal Courts] (proposing limitations on judicial scrutiny of public and private bureau-
cratic institutions); L. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985) (describing lobbying by
conservative political organizations to limit federal court subject matter jurisdiction in
civil rights cases).
49 See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (objecting to the adoption of the 1980 amendments to the Federal
Rules because they did not go far enough toward curbing discovery abuse). See generally
Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 806 (1981) (analyzing the underlying premises
of the dissenting opinion by Justice Powell and concluding that, given the lack of a
workable proposal to limit the scope of discovery, the Supreme Court was wise to adopt
the 1980 amendments).
50 Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev.
494 (1986).
11 See, e.g., ABA Action Comm'n to Reduce Court Costs and Delay, Attacking
Litigation Costs and Delay 59 (1984); Hoffman, Foreword to Federal Judicial Center,
Case Management and Court Management in United States District Courts at vii (1977);
Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., The Public's Image of Courts (Nat'l Center for
State Courts 1978).
-2 See Peckham, Judge as Case Manager, supra note 42.
53 See infra notes 96-142 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 143-149 and accompanying text.
5 See Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 43, at 448-49.
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Amidst discovery, reformulated summary judgment standards
increase the utility of the motion for defendants. 56 As a result,
more claims are dismissed before trial, lifting considerable bur-
dens from defendants and courts.57 These efficiency reforms at
each stage of the litigation process reduce the cost of dispute
resolution for many litigants and for the judicial system itself.
They also shorten the average time of disposition and lighten
court dockets. 58
Greater efficiency, however, does not ensure that the legal
process will be fairer or that the interests of all litigants will be
equally considered. A growing body of evidence and commen-
tary suggests two problems. First, efficiency reforms inhibit
overall access to the courts. Not only are certain litigation pro-
cesses truncated, but standards for entry into the system itself
are more exacting. This heightening of standards is part of a
design to shrink, or at least to retard, expansion of the system.
Second, public interest litigants and minorities in particular
pay a high price for systemic efficiency.59 As developed later in
'6 See infra notes 150-167 and accompanying text.
51 "Public demand for greater efficiency and economy, which is served by early
disposition of baseless claims and defenses, is insistent and well-founded." Schwarzer,
Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material
Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 467 (1984).
51 See, e.g., Planet, Reducing Case Delay and the Costs of Civil Litigation: The
Kentucky Economical Litigation Project, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 279 (1985) (study of case
management in Kentucky courts).
19 Speaking of "minorities" seems to imply a single viewpoint. There is, of course,
no single minority viewpoint or minority group. See Williams, Alchemical Notes: Re-
constructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401, 404
n.4 (1987) (discussing the imprecise fit or inappropriateness of the terms "disenfran-
chised," "oppressed people," and "minority" with reference to African-Americans). The
term minority, as often used, encompasses vastly differing groups with differing inter-
ests, experiences, and situations, including disparate ethnic groups, the disabled, and
gay men and lesbians, among others. Sometimes women are considered a minority
group. Each of these categorical groups is comprised of varying subgroups of intensely
connected and sometimes conflicting interests and values. See Cover, The Origins of
Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 Yale L.J. 1287, 1299 (1982) [here-
inafter Cover, Judicial Activism] (cautioning that "[tjo generalize to a 'minorities prob-
lem' suggests the irrelevance (or subordinate character) of any group's particular ex-
perience"); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 316 n.39 (1987) (the majority
is comprised of diverse and previously discriminated-against minorities). Individual
members of any group also have their own experiences and views on affirmative action,
discrimination, and social activism.
Whether a group is or is not a "minority" may depend on the perspective of
mainstream society held by the person assigning the label. See Minow, Foreword:
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this part, recent efficiency reforms discourage public interest,
contingent fee, and pro bono attorneys from litigating on behalf
of those outside the political and cultural mainstream who are
challenging prevailing legal, political, and social norms.60 An
unacknowledged premise of reform seems to be that these "mar-
ginal" litigants are expendable.
No single group masterminded the reforms, nor was a single
view of efficiency formally championed. Instead, three divergent
theories provided foundational support for the reform move-
ment's emphasis on reducing the public and private costs of
litigating. Their common assumption was the necessary linkage
Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 13 n.16 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Justice
Engendered] ("'minority' itself is a relative term" since minority implies difference that
"is only meaningful as a comparison"). Labeling a group a minority may be as much an
act of political expression as an act of description. For that reason, I like Martha
Minow's use of "people of difference." It is descriptive of differences that exist but
does not use a majority as the reference point. Since this Article addresses situations
created by procedural reforms' apparent adoption of a mainstream referent, however,
use of "minority" in its relational sense seems appropriate.
6 See infra notes 107-109, 114, 139 and accompanying text. Acknowledging the
problems of description and perspective recited in note 59, supra, and accepting them
as context, I find it useful and necessary to draw upon traditional sociological and
jurisprudential definitions of "minorities." My observations and comments should be
construed accordingly, as generalizations about political and social relationships that
may apply more to some groups or subgroups and less to others. The generalizations
are intended to address groups linked by two common factors: groups that (1) have
been stigmatized by mainstream society due to some characteristic of difference, e.g.,
skin color; and (2) lack immediate access to political power and opportunities for ready
coalition-building meaningfully to exert influence on mainstream decisionmakers. See
Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1983) (discussing and reconceptualizing the process defect
theory of Carolene Products' footnote four); Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public
Interest, 52 Yale L.J. 1, 2 (1942) (defining "minorities" as "'out-groups' disliked by
those who control the political and other organs of power in society ... because...
the group is itself considered a cause for distrust or even hostility"); Wirth, The Problem
of Minority Groups, in The Science of Man in the World Crisis 347 (R. Linton ed. 1945)
(defining minorities as a group which tends to regard itself as a people apart, singled
out from others in society for differential and unequal treatment and who therefore
regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination). These factors, despite many
other group differences, in part account for the minority labeling process and to a
general extent create shared social and psychological context that permit general ref-
erence to "minorities." This definitional approach is appropriate to an evaluation of
procedural reform that appears to embrace mainstream norms. For a critique of Ely's
process defect theory, see Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 23, at 345-47.
But see Cover, Judicial Activism, supra note 59, at 1299 (finding this "great intellectual
step" in social psychology to be of "dubious validity"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985) (noting that criteria for defining minorities,
such as immutable characteristics, lack of political power and vulnerability to prejudice
are difficult to apply).
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of efficiency with fairness. The three efficiency theories are
summarized below, without attention to complexity or subtlety,
to provide context for the subsequent analysis of specific
reforms.
A. Theories of Efficiency
1. Utilitarianism
According to utility theory, the purpose of dispute resolu-
tion procedure is the maximization of social welfare. Costs of
particular procedures are evaluated in light of general social
benefits.61 The Supreme Court's prevailing cost-benefit proce-
dural due process analysis builds upon but modifies traditional
utilitarian analysis. The Court views the purpose of procedure
as enhancing the accurate application of substantive law. 62 So-
ciety necessarily benefits as a result. When choosing between
procedures that enhance accuracy, "one calculates the costs of
each and then uses the one with the lowest total cost. '63 Pro-
cedures that do not enhance accuracy, despite other benefits,
are excluded from the calculus because they are inefficient by
definition. The Court's due process formulation in Mathews v.
Eldridge64 thus focuses narrowly on the costs and benefits as-
sociated with the accuracy of applications of substantive law to
facts. This concept of procedural efficiency has been roundly
criticized. One major criticism is that it assumes an extremely
narrow purpose of adjudication, ignoring other procedural val-
61 See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Actulcation in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value,
44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28, 46-49 (1976).
62 See id. at 30.
63 Bayles, Principles for Legal Procedure, 5 Law & Phil. 37, 44 (1986).
- 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews formulation requires consideration of:
[fQirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute
procedural requisites would entail.
Mashaw, supra note 61, at 30.
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ues such as individual dignity and participation in the govern-
mental process. 65
2. Law and Economics
Law and economics theory champions economic effi-
ciency.66 It transforms into quantitative terms traditional utility
theory's goal of promoting general social welfare. The law and
economics goal is the maximization of individual preferences.
These preferences are measured by wealth, which is maximized
when market forces operate freely. The market, undistorted by
governmental influence, should be the ultimate arbiter because
it reflects the value that parties place on their positions.6 7 Be-
cause market transactions entail costs of processing and cor-
recting mistakes, both of which impede the operation of market
forces, a goal of law and economics theory is the minimization
of transaction and error costs.68
In the litigation context, the goal is the adoption of the least
expensive procedure needed to replicate market results.69 Legal
procedure "is viewed as an expense incurred in achieving...
[wealth maximization], so the aim is to minimize the expense. '70
Parties are encouraged to "resolve disputes themselves consis-
tent with their own economic interest '71 and courts are to decide
unsettled disputes in a manner that furthers "efficiency-maxi-
65 See Mashaw, supra note 61, at 48. Mashaw also suggests that the "failing of
Eldridge is its focus on questions of technique rather than on questions of value," a
focus that "generates inquiry that is incomplete" because it is unresponsive to the "full
range" of procedural concerns. Id. at 30. He offers and critiques three "alternative
theories-individual dignity, equality, and tradition" that are "widely held" and sup-
ported "either implicitly or explicitly by the Supreme Court's due process jurispru-
dence." Id. at 46-47.
6 See generally C.J. Goetz, Law and Economics (1983) (discussing the contribution
of economic theory to developments in law).
6 R. Posner, The Economics of Justice 392 (1981).
61 See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Adminis-
tration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399, 400 (1973) [hereinafter Posner, Legal Procedure]; Posner,
Federal Courts, supra note 48.
69 Posner,'Legal Procedure, supra note 68.
70 Bayles, supra note 63, at 41.
71 Garth, Privatization and New Formalism: Making the Courts Safe for Bureau-
cracy, 1988 Law & Soc. Inq. 157, 161.
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mizing values. 7 2 Fairness flows from procedures that require
the least expense necessary to achieve accurate determinations.
In his influential critique of the federal courts, Judge Posner
underscores this framework.73 His emphasis on efficiency-max-
imizing values and call for the reduction of dispute resolution
burdens on federal courts draw upon seemingly neutral concepts
of widespread appeal. 74
Commentators have criticized law and economics theory
for its linkage of fairness with economic efficiency and its tri-
vialization of social values. 75 They have also criticized it for
masking political choices behind seemingly neutral principles.
As with the Supreme Court's utilitarian due process theory, law
and economics theory supports procedural reforms that shrink
the system of dispute resolution and decrease participation by
marginal claimants.
3. Accessibility
In contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure histori-
cally linked efficiency with access. 76 The drafters of the rules
intended to simplify the traditional procedural model, making
the system more accessible by making it more efficient. 77 The
72 Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 48, at 301; see also Bayles, supra note 63, at
45 ("The principle of economic costs: one should minimize the economic costs of legal
procedures").
7 Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 48.
74 Id. at 208, 301.
7 For insightful critiques of law and economics theory, see Singer, Legal Realism
Now, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 513 (1988); Seita, Common Myths in the Economic Analysis
of Law, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 993. See also Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The
Fiffieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 1, 25-26 (1988) [hereinafter Weinstein, Fiftieth Anniversary of Rules] (perceiving
a hidden agenda and observing "the relative weakening of our economic power ... has
lent weight to the increasing pressure of conservatives to reduce access to our courts
with the argument that the transactional costs are too heavy to bear. Increasingly, the
disparity of income has coincided with greater reluctance to continue the struggle for
equality in the courthouse"); Garth, supra note 71, at 163 (noting that dispute narrowing
under seemingly neutral law and economics efficiency principles "may quietly be leading
to a radical privatization of the courts").
76 In adopting the Rules in 1938, the Supreme Court noted that the simplified
procedures served the goals of efficiency and accessibility. See The Supreme Court
Adopts Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal District Courts, 24 A.B.A. J. 99 (1938).
77 See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: I. Pleadings and Practice,
44 Yale L.J. 1291 (1935) (urging simplification of the system through creation of a single
form of action and the merger of law and equity); Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23
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Rules, along with the first forty years of amendments, revolu-
tionized common law and code pleading regimes in basic phi-
losophy as well as in technical form. 78 Notice-pleading replaced
archaic fact-pleading. More people with legal grievances could
gain entry into the system.79 The merger of law and equity in
conjunction with encompassing joinder rules concentrated liti-
gation in a single forum. Liberal discovery prevented surprise.
These reforms responded to the technical rigidity of prior sys-
tems, which had fostered procedural manipulation and deem-
phasized decisions on the merits. 80 The drafters created a less
technical system designed to test claims according to informa-
tion discovered during the litigation, thereby opening the system
Wash. U.L.Q. 297 (1938) (justifying simplified and regularized procedure); Clark, Two
Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 435 (1958) (discussing philo-
sophical underpinnings of Rules at time of adoption). See also Smith, Judge Charles E.
Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 Yale L.J. 914, 952 (1976) (pointing
to Charles Clark's goal of reducing litigation costs and his strong support of rules
favoring plaintiffs).
78 See generally Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 351 (1987)
(arguing that the drafters of the 1938 rules, prompted by the confusion and lack of
uniformity caused by the 1872 Conformity Act in which federal courts were to apply
state law, tried to create an ideal process that would provide timely and fair justice to
all litigants and centralize federal practice and procedure).
7 See Cound, Friedenthal, Miller & Kane, Civil Procedure-Cases and Materials
441 (1985). Judge Weinstein asserts that the open access goals of the Rules have been
realized in significant respects in the 50 years following adoption.
When the Rules were first adopted, they were optimistically intended to clear
the procedural clouds so that the sunlight of substance might shine through.
Litigants would have straightforward access to courts. The courthouse door
was opened to let the aggrieved take shelter. To a very large extent the goal
has been reached as nearly as can be expected in a large [diverse] society such
as ours ....
Weinstein, supra note 75, at 23.
Weinstein acknowledges other salient factors in the opening of the federal courts:
"a powerful civil rights movement, expanded use of the contingent fee, increased power
of the bar, and a devotion of the profession to the principle that all Americans have the
right to vindication of what the substantive law in theory affords." Id. at 3. I would add
to this list, the congressional creation of "rights" enforceable by individuals in federal
court and the emergence of public interest law groups.
10 See generally Goodman, supra note 78, at 357 ("History records Clark as having
advocated two basic principles behind procedural reform. He believed that all cases
should be decided on their merits rather than on procedural maneuverings and that a
basic goal in litigation should be economy of time and resources"); Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspec-
tive, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common
Law].
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to many previously excluded. 81 Efficiency was linked to proce-
dural justice by rules fostering access.
The goal of "just, speedy and inexpensive"' 2 dispute reso-
lution, articulated in Rule 1, endures. The inefficient operation
of the Rules, however, has been criticized as undermining that
goal. For many committed to the Rules' regime, rejuvenation
of the procedural system entails reducing costs and burdens.
Efficiency is still linked to procedural justice, but now through
rules discouraging access. 83
For different reasons, all three theories have implicitly sup-
ported reform directed at reducing the public and private costs
of adjudication. All three have tended to assume a linkage of
efficiency with fairness. Cheaper and quicker means better and
fairer. They have also assumed procedural neutrality: efficiency
measures, litigant-neutral on their face, are neutral in their cu-
mulative effects. These assumptions have encouraged inquiry
into techniques for reducing economic costs and administrative
burdens without sustained inquiry into the value of the process
itself or into long-term group impact.84 Garth observes consid-
erable public "worry" over explicitly political matters but little
attention paid to the "series of seemingly innocuous [system
narrowing] reforms ... [that] are transforming litigation in quite
fundamental ways. 85
81 See also Weinstein, supra note 75, at 24-25 ("The Federal Rules swung the
courthouse door wide open. The political implications are now obvious . . . . [Tihe
Rules provided an immense shift towards increasing plaintiffs' capacity to enforce
substantive rights" and "provided the basis for an enormous effort, almost a quantum
jump, toward equality in fact"); Marcus & Sherman, Complex Litigation 1 (1985) ("Using
the new procedural tools that the Rules made available, creative litigants and judges
made the federal court system a significant force for social change.").
Stephen Subrin suggests that Clark and others pushed for expanded access in part
to engender support of New Deal constituencies. Subrin, The New Era in American
Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648, 1651 (1981) (cited in Goodman, supra note 78, at
352).
82 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
83 See Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights,
137 U, Pa. L. Rev. 2179, 2182 (1989) ("Much of the contemporary discussion on
procedural efficiency implies that a successful federal court system is one which most
effectively excludes certain kinds of substantive claims. Efficiency has taken on a value
of its own.").
84 Federal District Court Judge Robert Carter has observed "the development of a
school of thought that elevates ideals of efficiency over the [broader] adjudicatory ideals
that motivated the framers of the Rules" and a correlative "emergence of a substantive
bias in our procedlre." See id.
1- Garth, supra note 71, at 163. The court administration movement proceeds apace.
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B. Specific Procedural Reforms
To place the following observations in context, it must be
noted that cases are litigated by a variety of participants before
judges of varying political persuasions. In many of these cases,
the rules of civil procedure operate more or less even-handedly
and provide a workable framework for adjudication. That the
reformed procedural system operates acceptably in individual
cases does not mean, however, that the sustained cumulative
impact of the reforms is litigant-neutral. Procedures may operate
well in many cases and yet discretely prejudice the interests of
certain groups in others. This part examines the structure of
specific efficiency reforms and their probable cumulative impact
on groups asserting claims likely to be deemed "marginal" by
substantive law.86
Judges, court administrators and certain litigants desiring less bulky, complex, and
burdensome litigation continue the push. See Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evo-
lution of Procedure, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 306 (1986). Recently, Congress authorized
courts to mandate arbitration of cases. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1989). Summary jury
trials are used increasingly as settlement tools. See, e.g., Arabian Am. Oil Co. v.
Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988). Case screening and day-to-day case man-
agement are emphasized. Minow, Speaking of Silence (Book Review), 43 U. Miami L.
Rev. 496, 506 (1988) [hereinafter Minow, Speaking of Silence] (noting that from the
"legal administration" perspective, the "law should be carefully crafted to avoid false
incentives for lawsuits that are not warranted, or that should be resolved through less
costly means. Thus cases at the margin should be discouraged").
Risinger calls it a "counter-revolution" in procedure. Risinger, Another Step in the
Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to
Summary Judgment, 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 35, 351 (1988) [hereinafter Risinger, Counter-
Revolution] (procedural reform is a "cynical movement to restore to defendants, partic-
ularly powerful, established [repeat player] defendants, traditional procedural advan-
tages they lost by virtue of the Federal Rules' emphasis on full disclosure and decisions
on the merits").
86 Empirical studies have not definitively established the effects of recent reforms.
There has been relatively little empirical research about the Rules in operation. The
Federal Judicial Center's study of Rules 11 and 16, see infra note 102, and the Third
Circuit's Task Force on Rule 11, see infra note 98, represent initial efforts. This Article's
observations about the inhibitory effect of procedural reforms on minority access are
therefore cast in the traditional methodology of legal scholarship concerning effects, as
a grounded perception. The perception is shared by others. Preliminary studies generally
support it, as do commentators. It emerges from case studies, raw statistics, commen-
tary and, to a limited extent, personal experience. Although reliance on perception risks
stating the superficial at the expense of the subtle, the overall picture here is compelling
and worthy of description. It is a perception of reality by many attorneys and litigants
that affects litigation choices. One purpose of this Article is to provide a foundation for
further empirical study.
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1. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Alternative dispute resolution ["ADR"] is a response to
criticisms of excessive litigation costs and systemic insensitivity.
Mediation programs handle numerous family disputes. State-
mandated court-annexed arbitration systems have proliferated.
Congress recently authorized mandatory arbitration of cases
with monetary claims under $100,000.87 Members of the Su-
preme Court are supportive.8 8 Private arbitrators operating in
camera with minimal discovery, without formal evidentiary con-
straints, and, in a limited time frame, dispose of a vast array of
cases.
ADR appears to have many benefits. It shortens and re-
duces the cost of dispute resolution. Participants pay less for
lawyers. The judiciary pays less for judges, staff, juries and
facilities. ADR allows for early resolution of conflict by means
of settlement and deemphasizes winning or losing by court de-
cree. ADR seems to work for ordinary disputes and disputants, 89
The ADR paradigm is a squabble between neighbors, assuming
"a rough equality between contending parties." 90
For those on society's margins, however, ADR presents
problems of considerable importance. ADR removes disputes
from the light of public scrutiny. Deterrence and public educa-
tion values served by open proceedings are undermined by
ADR.91 The loss of a public forum can be critical for minorities.
Serious public consideration of minority perspectives is sacri-
ficed. ADR also transforms public debates about rights into
private judgments about needs, allowing hidden arbitrators to
17 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (establishing a five-year pilot program of mandatory arbitra-
tion, with a right of trial de novo, for cases of $100,000 or less in 10 specified judicial
districts and authorizing the Judicial Conference to select 10 additional districts for the
program).
11 Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a recent speech to the American Bar Association,
supported alternative methods of dispute resolution, citing the 269,000 cases filed in
federal court in 1988 and the need to reduce court caseloads. Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
Aug. 6, 1989, at A-13, col. 2.
9Barkai & Kassebaum, Using Court-AnnexedArbitration to Reduce Litigant Costs
and to Increase the Pace of Litigation, 16 Pepperdine L. Rev. 43 (1989).
10 Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984).
91 See Delgado, ADR and the Dispossessed: Recent Books About the Deformali-
zation Movement, 13 Law & Soc. Inq. 145, 151 (1988).
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decide disputes according to personal perceptions of minority
needs. 92
Richard Delgado's work on ADR points to the informalism
inherent in the structure of ADR that heightens the danger of
unfair treatment of minorities. 93 ADR abandons a formal pro-
cedural structure that can protect minorities from the biases of
decisionmakers and from abuses by other participants. ADR's
informalism also eliminates or severely curtails discovery. Op-
ponents with something to hide are better able to hide it. Novel,
difficult, or embarrassing claims may fail for lack of access to
existing information.
Private arbitrators lack authority to alter or reject existing
legal principles in light of developing legal and social concerns.
ADR also "trivializes the remedial dimensions of a lawsuit. '94
Arbitrators lack authority to shape, reshape and enforce reme-
dies that are often essential to the dispute resolution process,
especially in cases seeking "to safeguard public values by re-
structuring large-scale bureaucratic organizations. '' 95
2. Amended Rule 11
For litigation headed toward a federal forum, rigorous pre-
filing screening is the order of the day. Although reforms have
not formally altered the Federal Rules' notice pleading regime,
amended Rule 11 has restricted initial entry into the system. 96
92 See generally Trubek, The Handmaiden's Revenge: On Reading and Using the
Newer Sociology of Civil Procedure, 51 Law & Contemp. Probs. 111, 131 (1988)
[hereinafter Trubek, Sociology of Civil Procedure] (discussing how ADR shifts focus
from vindication of rights to satisfaction of needs and tends to reinforce existing power
imbalances).
93 Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1359 (1985)
[hereinafter Delgado, Risk of Prejudice].
14 Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 90, at 1082.
9' Id. at 1083 (discussing the detriments of avoiding formal adjudication by
settlement).
96 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 reads:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of
the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that
it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
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It may be too soon for definitive answers about the Rule's effect
on court access. Studies are monitoring litigant, attorney, and
judge behavior.97 Published opinions provide an incomplete pic-
ture of Rule 11 activity and caution has been advised in gener-
alizing on the basis of reported cases. 98
Nonetheless, some compelling conclusions can be drawn
from available information. The Rule's efficiency rationale is to
lessen the time and cost of litigation by deterring frivolous fil-
ings. 99 Its pre-1983 subjective bad faith standard for sanctioning
untoward filings made the rule dysfunctional. 00 With its empha-
sis on "reasonableness," new Rule 11 gives the judge a weapon
in the quest for greater efficiency. It has deterred careless, ill-
conceived filings.' 10 Attorneys have developed a Rule 11 con-
sciousness: "stop, look, and investigate" before filing. 0 2 That is
for the better. When the tide of litigation interpreting Rule 11
subsides, the Rule may be judged alive and useful for ordinary
cases involving essentially private disputes. 103
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation . . . . If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction .... including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
97 In addition to the Federal Judicial Center study, see supra note 102, and the
Third Circuit Task Force study, see infra note 98, studies are being conducted by the
ABA Litigation Section Task Force on Rule I 1 and the Center for Constitutional Rights.
11 See Burbank, Rule I 1 in Transition: The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force
on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Conclusion 1) 4-6 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank,
Rule I 1 in Transition]. Most early reported Rule 11 opinions concerning public interest
issues did not acknowledge special concerns in the sanctioning process.
" See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986).
100 Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 34-42 (1976) [hereinafter
Risinger, Striking Problems]; Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 43, at 429-30.
101 See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1988) [hereinafter
Schwarzer, Rule 11].
101 The Third Circuit's Task Force on Rule 11 found in its year-long empirical study
that "Rule 11 has had effects on the pre-filing conduct of many attorneys in this circuit
of the sort hoped for by the rule makers and has yielded other benefits." Burbank, Rule
II in Transition, supra note 98.
The Federal Judicial Center Report on Rule 11 concludes that the rule has deterred
wasteful filings "by making lawyers more aware of their specific professional duty to
investigate and research claims before filing." Federal Judicial Center, The Rule 11
Sanctioning Process (1988).
103 See Schwarzer, Rule 11, supra note 101. The Supreme Court's only Rule 11
decision is Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989)
(addressing the narrow issue of whether sanctions can be imposed against the offending
attorney's firm).
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But all is not well. Rule 11 disproportionately affects civil
rights cases. Early Rule 11 research suggests that Rule 11 is
being "used disproportionately against plaintiffs, particularly in
certain types of litigation such as civil rights cases, employment
discrimination cases, securities fraud cases brought by investors
and antitrust cases brought by small companies."" 4 The Third
Circuit Task Force on Rule 11 recently completed a year-long
study of all civil cases in that circuit's district courts. The Task
Force acknowledged that sanctions were not routine in the Third
Circuit but nevertheless found that Rule 11 had a markedly
disproportionate impact on civil rights cases.10 5 The Task Force
concluded that Rule 11 has "changed the role of the attorney"
and may lessen the "threshold probability that a lawyer will take
a case or pursue an argument." This may "combine with other
factors to inhibit access to the courts for litigants with marginal,
even arguable, claims or defenses."' 0 6
What has emerged among many lawyers, judges and com-
mentators is the perception that Rule 1l's disproportionate im-
pact on civil rights and other public interest cases dissuades
attorneys and litigants from contemplating these types of law-
suits. 0 7 Sanctions in civil rights cases are sometimes imposed
114 Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200 (1988). Of the reported
Rule 11 cases in Vairo's study, 28.1% were civil rights and employment discrimination
cases. A similar study by Nelken revealed that although civil rights filings comprised
only 7.6% of the filings for 1983-85, civil rights cases comprised 22.3% of the Rule 11
cases during that period. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo.
L.J. 1313, 1327 (1986). Plaintiffs in these cases were sanctioned four times as often as
defendants. Id. at 1328 nn.96-97. In a cautionary note, the Third Circuit Task Force
Report warns of overreliance on statistics of published cases. The Task Force study
found that only 9.1% of district court decisions involving Rule 11 were reported. The
ratio of sanctions over requests was much higher for reported cases (40%) than for all
cases (19.8%). Burbank, Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 98, at 99.
105 Burbank, Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 98, at 61-62, 69. The Task Force
found that the Third Circuit's approach to Rule 11 is a cautious one, generally limiting
Rule 11 to "exceptional" cases of frivolousness. Id. at 85. It still found that Rule 11 had
a markedly disproportionate impact on civil rights plaintiffs in the circuit. Civil rights
plaintiffs and their attorneys were sanctioned at a "considerably higher rate" (47.1%)
than plaintiffs in other cases (8.45%). Id. at 69.
106 Id. at 7. The Task Force was particularly concerned about the adverse effects
of Rule 11 sanctions on poor litigants. See id. at 71-72.
107 See, e.g., LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 Val.
U.L. Rev. 331 (1988); Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 Buffalo L. Rev.
485 (1989); Valro, supra note 104. My own initially cautious view of Rule 11 has become
more so. The Rule's benefits--and there have been benefits to courts, litigants, and the
public-must now be evaluated not just in light of a theoretical possibility of a chilling
of court access, but in light of recent empirical evidence of disproportionate impact.
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in "very close cases"'10 8 and are often imposed for plaintiffs'
attorneys' assertions of novel legal theories that courts deter-
mine to be unfounded. 0 9
The shared assumption of commentators is that Rule ll's
chilling effect is bad: it stifles the growth of common law and
retards social progress. Some room exists for debate about the
wisdom of sanctioning attorneys disproportionately in cases in-
volving public law issues. 10 There are many more public law
cases than there were thirty years ago. 1' Some think too many
of these cases have been litigated for ulterior purposes. Others
think too many civil rights complaints are knee-jerk reactions
to governmental grievance. 12 A recent study of constitutional
tort litigation indicates that this is not the case. 13 But viewpoints
vary.
103 Vairo, supra note 104, at 217 (sanctions in many, although not all, civil rights
and public interest cases involved "very close cases").
109 Id. at 205-06. Vairo found that "most of the sanctions in the civil rights categories
are awarded because the plaintiff's legal theory has been held to be frivolous." Id. at
202. Rule I 1 sanctions are most frequently awarded in civil rights cases when the claim
is inconsistent with well-settled principles of law. The Task Force warned against a
sanctioning approach that penalized attorneys for advancing novel arguments. "Rule 11
may be regarded as a case management tool, but it is one that should be used with the
greatest possible caution in cases where plaintiffs seek vindication of what they perceive
to be their constitutional rights." Burbank, Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 98.
This suggests that some, if not many, courts are narrowly reading Rule 1l's allow-
ance of "a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The advisory committee note to Rule 11 also cautions that the
amended Rule is not intended to "chill" creative advocacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11., advisory
committee's note.
110 Vairo finds it "difficult to generalize about what these statistics mean." They
could mean that "there are relatively more frivolous civil rights cases" or "that Rule 11
is an unfair tool for defendants that allows them to unfairly attack this kind of litigation,
which has long been a bane to their existence." Vairo, supra note 104, at 201. The
Federal Judicial Center study offered possible explanations of statistics showing dispro-
portionate impact on civil rights plaintiffs. One explanation equated the likelihood of
sanctions to the amount of judicial involvement required. The more time-consuming the
case, and civil rights cases tend to require substantial judge time, the greater likelihood
of sanctions. Federal Judicial Center, supra note 102, at 162-63.
M See Chayes, Role of the Judge, supra note 44.
12 "Relatively low barriers to entry have . . . generated an undesirable result-a
deluge of frivolous or vexatious claims, filed by the uninformed, the misinformed, and
the unscrupulous." Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985).
223 Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence
of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 719
(1988). The study found that the number of constitutional tort cases filed in federal court
has actually been less than popularly perceived. The study "uncovered little evidence
that the number of constitutional torts should be a cause for special concern." Id. at
779. Referring to their earlier study, Schwab and Eisenberg noted that the proportion
of civil rights filings as compared to the entire federal civil docket declined during the
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The present inquiry focuses more narrowly upon an area
of generally shared assumptions in which there has been little
critical discourse: the inhibiting effect of Rule 11 on judicial
access for minorities. 114 Judge Carter observes that "Rule 11 has
not been wielded neutrally"11 5 and that applications of the rule
evince "extraordinary substantive bias" against certain minority
claims.11 6 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Szabo Food Service
v. Canteen Corp. is illustrative. 117
In Szabo, a minority contractor challenged the loss of its
food service contract with a county jail, alleging racial discrim-
ination, due process violations and pendent state law claims. 18
An evaluation committee had given Szabo's bid top rating but
the county board had accepted another company's bid. After
seeking an expedited hearing on its application for a preliminary
injunction, Szabo voluntarily dismissed its federal complaint and
filed suit in state court. The federal district court judge denied
the defendant's motion for sanctions following dismissal." 9 The
period from 1975 to 1984. Id. at 721 (citing Schwab & Eisenberg, The Reality of
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 641, 658-68 (1987)).
14 During the debate about the proposal to amend Rule 11, critics questioned
whether the Rule would chill zealous but legitimate advocacy, limit the development of
the law, and harm relationships between attorneys and judges, and among attorneys.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules subsequently acknowledged these concerns in
the final version of the Rule and its report. It did not address, however, concerns about
diminishing access for the poor or social groups likely to be asserting marginal claims,
especially minorities. See Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Analysis of Comments
Regarding Committee's Proposed Amendments to Rules 7 and 11, at 2-3 (Dec. 1981)
(discussed in Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example
of Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925, 1952, 1955 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank,
Transformation].
"5 Carter, supra note 83, at 2192.
116 Id.
17 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988). The following
discussion of Szabo and other cases is not necessarily representative of judicial views
and behavior in all circuits or even in most cases. The cases are significant because
they are neither aberrations nor loosely considered decisions. They are decisions by
well-regarded judges that have captured the attention and engendered the concern of
lawyers, judges and scholars. They are also significant because they reflect the prevailing
thinking of some courts and because they have become part of litigators' consciousness.
11 Id. at 1075. Prior to bidding on a second contract, Szabo Foods, which held the
first contract, formed a joint venture with a minority-owned restaurant enterprise, thus
qualifying to bid for the 30% minority set-asides.
19 The American rule precluded an award of attorney's fees to defendants and the
Civil Rights Attorney's Award Act was inapplicable since defendants were not "pre-
vailing parties." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Defendants were not even entitled to costs
since, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i), dismissal was voluntary. Szabo later filed an
unsuccessful state law action in state court.
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Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of defendant's request for
fees and remanded, holding Szabo's due process claim frivolous
and indicating that the district court should find the discrimi-
nation claim frivolous as well.
Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judge Posner, noted that
since Szabo had "imposed costs on its adversary and the judicial
system by violating Rule 11, it must expect to pay. ' 120 In finding
the violation, the court engaged in a very narrow analysis of the
legal foundation for Szabo's due process claims.12' Easterbrook
also went to seemingly improper lengths to signal to the district
court the frivolousness of the equal protection claim. Szabo
claimed that it qualified for minority set-asides established by
county ordinance. The majority concluded that such set-asides
were probably unconstitutional and therefore could not serve as
a basis for Szabo's claim. In light of Szabo's voluntary dis-
missal, the issue of minority set-asides had not been fully liti-
gated. More important, the court's ruling appeared to conflict
in principle with a Supreme Court decision upholding congres-
sionally legislated minority set-asides. 22 At a minimum, Szabo
had a plausible legal argument supporting its position.
Why did the majority reverse the district court and remand
for the imposition of sanctions? Judges Easterbrook and Posner,
two eminent conservative jurists, revealed their disaffection for
Szabo and its constitutional claims when they speculated that
the motive for the claims may have been to harass the defen-
dants. 123 One criticism of the opinion is that the judges employed
Rule 11 to signal general distaste for minority equal protection
and due process challenges to governmental practices and to
deter filing of all but the most certain of such claims. 124
Dissenting Judge Cudahy criticized the majority's expan-
sive approach toward Rule 11. He predicted that the "chilling
1,0 823 F.2d at 1079.
M2 Szabo based its "entitlement" to due process on L & H Sanitation v. Salt Lake
City Sanitation, 769 F.2d 517, 523-24 (8th Cir. 1985) and Three Rivers Cablevision v.
City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa. 1980). The majority found those cases,
concededly supporting Szabo's argument, to be "obscure" and contrary to the greater
weight of authority. 823 F.2d at 1081-82.
122 See Fullilove v: Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
12 823 F.2d at 1082.
,24 See LaFrance, supra note 107, at 333. See also Lepucki, 765 F.2d 86 (another
Seventh Circuit case evincing a similar view).
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effect of today's decision will reach as tellingly to the most
meritorious [of] such claim[s] as to the least." 12 5 Judge Cudahy
further observed, "Rule 11 [will be transformed] from a protec-
tion against frivolous litigation.., into a fomenter of derivative
litigation, a mire for unwary parties and overzealous courts.' 126
Another application of Rule 11 evincing a substantive bias
involves the government officials' good faith immunity defense.
Some courts require that a civil rights plaintiff's attorney attest
when suit is filed that the defendant government official cannot
succeed on an immunity defense.1 27 The defendant, however,
usually controls all or most of the information relevant to that
defense. 28 Plaintiff's attorney is therefore thrust into an unfair
dilemma. Does she refrain from filing what appears to be a
plausible civil rights claim to avoid sanctions out of fear that
her client may lose on an affirmative defense about which only
limited information is initially available? Or does she fie, gam-
bling that the defendant cannot establish good faith immunity
and that sanctions will therefore not be imposed? One judge
characterizes the approach as "no information until litigation,
but no litigation without information."'' 29
This approach to Rule 11 not only undercuts notice pleading
standards, it erects an inordinately high barrier between courts
"2 823 F.2d at 1086 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126 Id. at 1085. See Burbank, Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 98. In Brown v.
Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit
followed Szabo and affirmed an award of sanctions against an African-American doctor
and his attorney who challenged the state licensing exam on race and age discrimination
grounds not warranted by existing law. "Rule 11 is the appropriate vehicle to punish
those who abuse their right of access to the federal courts." Id. at 1439. Sanctions were
deemed appropriate even though the court acknowledged that the law on the pivotal
state action issue was "complex and fluid," id. at 1436, and despite the district court's
failure to decide whether the claims were "so 'untenable' as to justify sanctions." Id.
at 1437.
127 The plaintiff in Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985), asserted civil rights
violations by a state district attorney and judge. Prior to Elliot, the Supreme Court
established that good faith official immunity is an affirmative defense that must be
asserted by the defendant. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). The Fifth Circuit
ignored the Court's pronouncement and sent the following message through its Rule 11
analysis: a minority plaintiff's civil rights filing against a government official is sanc-
tionable unless plaintiff's attorney is able to certify at the time of filing that the "defen-
dant official cannot successfully show he has the defense of immunity." 751 F.2d at
1482.
'2 For this reason, among others, the Supreme Court in Gomez denoted the defense
an affirmative defense.
129 Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1986) (Pratt, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986).
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and minorities with civil rights claims against local government
officials.130 Another approach, with similar impact, links a plain-
tiff's failure to survive summary judgment with Rule 11 sanc-
tions. In Bryant v. O'Connor,13 ' an African-American former
employee of a federal district court judge alleged discrimination
in the termination of his employment. Bryant challenged the
notion that judicial robes cleanse the wearer of even subtle
prejudice. His claim seemed likely to fail. 32 The district court,
however, expanded the boundaries of Rule 11 seemingly to
punish Bryant for making the charges and attempting to expose
bias in the local courts. The court denied his request for limited
discovery to respond to defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment, 33 granted summary judgment, and imposed sanctions. In
so doing, the court articulated a startling interpretation of Rule
11: if at the time of filing the plaintiff lacks evidence to defeat
defendant's subsequent summary judgment motion, the plaintiff
has probably violated Rule 11.34 If the court means what it said,
the consequences are severe. Rule 11 precludes filing of em-
130 Perhaps in response to criticisms of rulings such as Elliot, the Fifth Circuit, en
bane, recently adopted a strong position on the preclusion ofjudicial access for litigants
already sanctioned. The court stated that "the imposition of sanctions must not result
in total, or even significant, preclusion of access to the courts." Thomas v. Capital Sec.
Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 881 (5th Cir. 1988). Where an immediately payable monetary
sanction order might financially prevent the litigant from continuing with the suit, the
district judge must, at the litigant's request, (1) make the sanction payable after final
judgment, or (2) explain "why the award does not have such a preclusive effect." Id.
at 881-82.
131 671 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Kan. 1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1988).
12 The federal district court judges, en bane, in a quasi-administrative review, had
approved Bryant's dismissal. Id. at 1281.
133 In response to the court's order, plaintiff's attorney submitted a discovery plan
of five depositions of court personnel. The district court rejected the plan because it
did not explain why those people were to be deposed. Id. at 1282-83.
234 "Plaintiff argues that he has insufficient facts to respond to the motion for
summary judgment. This suggests that plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements
of Rule I1." Id. at 1283. Taking what appears to be a contrary view in a non-Rule 11
situation involving filing fee waivers for indigents, the Supreme Court recently held that
a complaint is not automatically "frivolous" because it fails to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). Writing for the Court in Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989), Justice
Marshall stated that the standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), precluding waiver of filing fees
for complaints filed in forma pauperis differs from the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Not all
unsuccessful claims are frivolous. Id. at 1833. Marshall cautioned against denying
indigent plaintiffs the same protections of Rule 12(b)(6) accorded those with resources,
like the opportunity to amend the complaint before the motion to dismiss is heard. Such
protections are denied if an indigent's complaint is dismissed sua sponte as frivolous
under § 1915(d). Id. at 1834.
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ployment discrimination claims against powerful institutional
defendants when those claims cannot survive summary judg-
ment at the outset. If the court did not mean what it said, then
a pall of racial favoritism hangs over its personnel decisions.
Rule 11 appears in this light to be a pretext for avoidance of full
exploration and public explication of the substantive charges.
Either scenario discourages minority claimants when critical
evidence of discrimination initially rests in the control of insti-
tutional defendants.
For this reason, substantive bias underlying publicized ap-
plications of Rule 11 may be taking its "toll in intimidation from
those who are seeking to vindicate novel rights by means of
untried strategies. ' 135 Judge Carter cites recent sanctions of
$54,000 against NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
counsel and $30,000 against two plaintiffs. 136 Judge Reinhardt of
the Ninth Circuit has expressed similar concern about lower
court interpretation and application of Rule 11 to deter all but
mainstream claims based on settled legal principles. In Oper-
ating Engineers Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 137 the district court
13- Carter, supra note 83, at 2192. Professor Tobias aptly describes the "inherent
characteristics" of civil rights litigation that encourage Rule 11 sanctions when advancing
"untested theories of law." Civil rights suits attempting to "assert new or comparatively
untested theories of law ... are at the cutting edge of legal development, which means
that they are difficult to conceptualize and substantiate .... [D]iscovery can be essential
to drafting a very specific complaint or to articulating a precise theory ... and ... the
concepts, once formulated, look non-traditional and even implausible." Tobias, supra
note 107, at 496-97.
136 See Carter, supra note 83, at 2194 (citing Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204
(E.D.N.C. 1987)). In Harris, minority plaintiffs charged the Army with discrimination
in its civilian employment practices in a particular locale. The case was cumbersome,
with 6 original plaintiffs and 44 intervenors. The trial was long and some degree of
judicial frustration about case management may have been understandable. See id. at
1227-37. The trial judge's Rule I1 decision, however, seemed to signal distaste for the
substance of antidiscrimination law, noting that "charges of racism, if proved, carry an
enormously stigmatizing effect." Id. at 1221. Plaintiffs had survived summary judgment
but lost at trial on the issue of subjective intent. The court imposed sanctions apparently
to discourage racial discrimination suits unsupported by direct evidence of "illicit in-
tent." Standing Title VII on its head, the trial judge found that "to the extent any racism
was proven ... such discrimination was generally perpetrated by the plaintiffs upon
the defendant, not the reverse, for it was the plaintiffs who consistently saw every
criticism and action in a blindly racial context." Id. at 1227.
137 859 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[W]e have been required with some regulafrity to
reverse district court awards of sanctions." Id. at 1345). See, e.g., United Energy
Owners Comm. v. U.S. Energy Management Sys., 837 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1988); Gonzales
v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1987); Lemos v. Fencl, 828 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1987);
Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1987); California
370 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 25
ruled against the plaintiffs and imposed Rule 11 sanctions for
plaintiffs' unsuccessful legal argument. The Ninth Circuit not
only vacated the award of sanctions, it reversed the district
court on the merits. Judge Reinhardt chastised the district court
for sanctioning plaintiffs making eminently plausible legal ar-
guments and for thereby erecting a barrier to the courts for
those seeking to change the law. 138
Rule 11 sanctions escalate the professional and financial
risk of litigating cases that are important to bring but difficult to
win. Contingent fee, reduced fee, and pro bono lawyers and
public interest firms are most likely to represent minorities rais-
ing difficult issues. In so doing, they accept a financial risk. If
their clients lose, and they often will, the attorneys receive little
or no compensation. For a small firm or a public interest law
organization, that risk can be significant. If losing, however,
means not only uncompensated time spent but also out-of-
pocket payment of defendants' attorney's fees, the risk expands
exponentially. 39 The NAACP has thus called for repeal of Rule
Architectural Bldg. Prods. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1987); Golden
Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Yagman,
796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir.
1985).
See also Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 631-32 (1986):
New ideas of justice reflected in the very categories of cases to which Rule 11
is most often applied have in recent years expanded the meaning of equality,
the scope of individual rights, and the strength of the welfare state. The degree
to which the legal system should remain open as a forum for debate about,
and even adoption of, new versions of justice is part of what is at stake in
decisions about how broadly to use Rule 11.
" 859 F.2d 1336. Operating Engineers stands firmly for the view that "free access
to the judicial system" is essential and that Rule 11 sanctions should be reserved for
the "rare and exceptional case where the action is clearly frivolous." Id. at 1344. See
also Eastway Constr. Corp, v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), remanded,
637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 918 (1987).
139 The $1 million sanction imposed upon the Christie Institute and its attorneys is
a notable example. The Rule I 1 sanction heard around the country, imposed upon the
Christie Institute, also involved issues of government accountability for corruption and
illegal covert activities, this time in Central America. In Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp.
1544 (SD. Fla. 1989), the district court imposed sanctions of almost one million dollars
upon plaintiffs and their attorneys, the liberal Christie Institute law group and its lead
counsel.
One of the plaintiffs had been injured by a bomb in the jungles of Nicaragua. He
alleged that he was a victim of an international conspiracy "spanning thirty years and
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11140 as has a coalition of scholars.141 Others are attempting to
craft workable guidelines to restrict the Rule's application.142
3. Civil Rights Pleading Requirements
Linked to concerns about Rule 1l's chill are heightened
pleading standards for civil rights cases. Although the Supreme
Court has not countenanced such elevated pleading require-
ments, several courts have boosted civil rights fact pleading
thresholds well above those provided by the Federal Rules in
an apparent effort to deter initiation of "disfavored" actions. 143
One reason some courts disfavor civil rights cases is the time
and cost of litigation. The requirement of particularized fact
pleading in a civil rights action is premised on a belief that "[a]
claim of this sort should not be initiated unless there is a suffi-
cient factual basis to justify the extensive litigation that such a
involving the activities of former United States Government Officials, Central Intelli-
gience Agency operatives, Colombian druglords and arms merchants in Cuba, Southeast
Asia, the Middle East, and Central America." Id. at 1545. After two years of discovery,
the district court dismissed the claims and imposed sanctions, finding an "abuse ofjudicial process" and that the "Christic Institute, must have known prior to suing that
[the plaintiffs] had no competent evidence to substantiate the theories alleged in their
complaint." Id.
The Christic Institute has gained considerable notoriety in its efforts to obtain
support for its appeal and to raise funds to pay the fine. Whether the case was carelessly
conceived or poorly litigated appears to be an open question. The clear public message
emanating from the district court and carried by the Christic Institute itself is that Rule
I1 is operating to chill all but the most certain claims of government corruption and
lack of accountability.
140 Resolution No. 11, The Repeal of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, The Crisis (Dec. 1988).
141 In 1989, a group of law professors submitted a formal request to the Reporter
Federal Rules Advisory Committee requesting reconsideration and repeal of amended
Rule 11. See also Tobias, supra note 107, at 525 (recommending immediate reformulation
or repeal).
142 See ABA Section on Litigation, Subcommittee Guidelines to Rule 11
[forthcoming].
141 E.g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 667 (3d Cir. 1988); Hale
v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency,
733 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.
1980); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976); Valley v. Maule,
297 F. Supp. 958 (D. Conn. 1968). See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law,
supra note 80, at 984; Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 471 (1986).
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claim entails.' 144 Another reason that some courts disfavor these
cases is their distaste for the substantive goals of civil rights
litigation. 45
Under either rationale, heightened fact pleading require-
ments for civil rights claims "would seem to violate the Federal
Rules," since the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8, rather
than the particularized pleading requirements of Rule 9, govern
civil rights claims. 46 The heightened requirements nevertheless
seem to be widespread. Commenting on the systematic appli-
cation of "very strict pleading standards at odds with ... Rule
8(a)," Roberts observes, "this trend now has attained great mo-
mentum, possibly because [of] such a strict standard's perceived
virtue-the judicial ability to dispose summarily of unattractive
cases."147
One consequence is to discourage the filing of minority civil
rights claims where evidence of wrongdoing is in the hands of
the institutional defendants. This result undermines the deci-
sions-on-the-merits philosophy of the Federal Rules. 148 Another
consequence, which further inhibits court access, is attorneys'
144 Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130, 1137 (D. Conn. 1978). See also Hale v.
Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[The day is past when our notice pleading
practice ... plus liberal discovery rules invited the federal practitioner to file suit first
and find out later whether he had a case").
14S See Marcus, supra note 143, at 471, 477 ("The most common focus for disap-
proval are civil rights cases, but such claims should not be disfavored." Marcus also
observes greater fact specificity required in a related and also "disfavored" type of case,
that is, claims of "the poor").
146 Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniver-
sary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C.L. Rev. 1023, 1037 (1989) [hereinafter Louis, Doubtful
Litigation]. See also Marcus, supra note 143, at 449 (despite the absence of authorization
in the Federal Rules, "[m]any lower federal courts have nevertheless revived fact
pleading requirements in such [civil rights] cases"). Cf. Associated Gen. Contractors v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983) (noting in dictum
in a massive antitrust case that district courts should insist upon "some specificity in
pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed"); Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam) (pro se inmate civil rights complaints are
to be assessed under a less stringent standard than complaints prepared by attorneys).
147 Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading and Standing, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 390,
416-21 (1980). Heightened fact pleading requirement for securities fraud cases, the other
major target of "fact pleading," is expressly authorized by Federal Rule 9(b). In contrast,
heightened fact pleading for civil rights cases is unauthorized by the Rules. Marcus,
supra note 143, at 447, 449.
148 See Louis, Doubtful Litigation, supra note 146, at 1038 ("Civil rights claims
often involve clandestine wrongdoing and unequal access to the evidence [and] they
sometimes cannot be pleaded with particularity.").
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escalated financial and professional risk in light of expansively
applied Rule 11 sanctions for claims not "well-grounded in
fact."1
49
4. Reformulated Summary Judgment Standards
New summary judgment standards await plaintiffs who
make it past ADR, remain undeterred by Rule 11, and survive
heightened pleading standards. The courts have reformulated
summary judgment law for certain civil rights appeals and for
defendant motions generally.
Government officials are burdened by the defense of civil
rights claims. Although the actual number of constitutional tort
filings has been steadily declining, some perceive civil rights
cases as clogging the courts and hampering the performance of
public officials.150 To lessen the burden on these officials, the
Supreme Court restructured the appealability of certain denials
of summary judgment motions. In Mitchell v. Forsyth,'5 ' the
Court held that where the defendant raises a qualified immunity
defense, a district court's denial of the defendant's summary
judgment motion based on that defense is immediately appeal-
able. 152 Litigation of the case is stayed pending defendant's
appeal. Defendants hold the key to the courthouse door and
thereby have gained a tremendous procedural advantage. Sum-
mary judgment denials are not appealable by right in other types
of cases. The result in the civil rights realm is that plaintiffs and
their attorneys must consider the added time and cost of filing
suit in light of defendants' right to fie interlocutory appeals.
Heightening the risk are lower court interpretations of Mitchell
that allow the defendant multiple pretrial appeals. 53
General summary judgment analysis has been significantly
altered by a trilogy of recent Supreme Court cases. As a result,
149 See supra notes 107-109, 114, 139 and accompanying text.
1S0 Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 113, at 720-21.
151 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
152 Id. at 526-27. In Mitchell, the Court held that in light of Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982), good faith immunity is a narrow, purely legal determination and
the denial of summary judgment on that issue qualifies as an appealable collateral order
under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1941).
,53 See, e.g., Chapman v. Pickett, No. 83-28 (7th Cir. Jan. 5, 1988); Green v.
Carlson, 826 F.2d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 1987).
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products liability, employment discrimination, and civil rights
plaintiffs, particularly those attempting to prove illegality by
circumstantial evidence and minorities asserting claims based
on alternative social construction of "facts," will find their ac-
cess to a public trial curtailed.
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist in Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett,154 Rule 56 enables defendants to move for summary
judgment by asserting simply that the plaintiff has not discov-
ered sufficient evidence to support her claim. Defendants no
longer need to support motions with affirmative evidence ne-
gating an element of the plaintiff's claim.1 55 For such motions,
respondent-plaintiff in effect bears the entire burden of produc-
ing, organizing and arguing the evidence.1 56 Celotex thus makes
a defendant's summary judgment motion a potential discovery
device and "tool[ ] of harassment."' 157
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby 58 and Matsushita Electrical In-
dustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.159 further enhance the utility
of summary judgment motions for defendants. Anderson abro-
gated the "scintilla of evidence" standard for denying summary
judgment motions and replaced it with an ostensible evaluation
of the "quality" and the "caliber" of the evidence and a weighing
154 77 U.S. 317 (1986).
155
T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery and upon a motion, against a party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.
Id, at 322. In the hope of tempering the forceful and sweeping impact of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's statement, Justice Brennan, dissenting, noted, "plainly, a conclusory as-
sertion that the non-moving party has no evidence is insufficient. Such a 'burden' of
production is no burden at all and would simply permit summary judgment procedure
to be converted into a tool for harassment." Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
156 See Kaufman v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169 (Ist Cir. 1988) (applying
the Celotex approach in a political discrimination case and awarding defendants sum-
mary judgment); LaBeach v. Nestle Co., 658 F. Supp. 676, 687-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(applying the Celotex approach in a race discrimination case and holding that the
respondent-plaintiff "is required to come forward with some proof that there is a genuine
issue of material fact. There has been no evidence presented of systemic discrimination
or disparate impact").
137 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
01477 U.S. 242 (198"6).
159 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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of conflicting evidence according to the standard of proof at
trial, e.g., preponderance of the evidence. 160 Matsushita dis-
couraged the assertion of novel legal theories in complex cases.
It authorized summary judgment when the judge deems the
plaintiff's theory "implausible," even though conflicts of mate-
rial fact exist,161 and required the plaintiff-respondent to present
"evidence that tends to exclude the possibility" that the defen-
dant acted poperly. 62 These troublesome aspects of Matsushita
have been extended by lower courts to employment discrimi-
nation cases to empower the judge first to assess the implausi-
bility of the claim and then to dismiss it, despite inferences
jurors might draw from direct evidence favorable to the plain-
tiff.163 As a result, considerable interpretive discretion has been
infused into the summary judgment calculus, thereby facilitating
dismissal of marginal claims.
The expressed goal of reformulating summary judgment
standards is the elimination of "meritless" claims or defenses
earlier in the litigation process to make the system more effi-
cient. Most judges, lawyers and commentators have long per-
ceived a need to make the summary judgment mechanism more
balanced and useful. The Supreme Court trilogy and the reforms
proposed by the Advisory Committee,' 64 however, have not
steered a middle course between plaintiffs and defendants. In-
stead, they have dramatically shifted litigation power to defen-
dants by encouraging the dismissal of marginal claims. One
commentator recently observed that amendments to Rule 56
,60 477 U.S. at 252, 254 (judge must "bear in mind the actual quantum and quality
of proof necessary to support liability" and determine whether the "evidence presented
... is of insufficient caliber or quantity").
161 475 U.S. at 587 (finding plaintiffs' theory made "no economic sense" and was
"implausible").16 2 Id.
163 In Beard v. Whitley County R.E.M.C., 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988), the Seventh
Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant employer on a gender discrimi-
nation claim, although plaintiff proffered direct evidence of statements by the defendant
that might have been construed by jurors as showing "anti-female animus." The judge,
making his own assessment of plausibility, said he did not "believe" that the evidence
raised "anything more than a 'metaphysical doubt' [about defendant's intent] that, under
Matsushita is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 410 (citation
omitted).
'6 See Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 105-20 (Sept. 1989).
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proposed by the Advisory Committee are "unabashedly pro-
defendant.' ' 65 Another described the trilogy's reformation of
standards as a "terrible trap for the unwary" plaintiff.166 One
apparent effect of the changes has been to preclude trials of
claims of public concern not supported by hard evidence. An-
other effect has been to deprive juries of opportunities to reas-
sess the meaning of undisputed "facts" in light of changing social
conditions. 67 Minorities will likely feel the impact. Altered sum-
mary judgment standards bear the potential for decreasing a
minority plaintiff's chances of publicly presenting her perspec-
tive and highlighting underlying social issues.
5. Other Procedural Reforms
This sometimes subtle constri-tion of access at each stage
of the judicial process is accorr panied by other developments
that have narrowed access to the courthouse for public interest
litigants and minorities.
Over the last ten years, the doctrines of standing' 16 and
eleventh amendment immunity' 69 have evolved to limit plain-
165 Louis, The Past, Present, and Future of Summary Judgment, presentation given
to the Association of American Law Schools' Section on Civil Procedure (Jan. 5, 1989)
(recording on file with the author). Martin Louis also commented that the power shift
is so pronounced that it takes the rule "past middle ground, back to the Field Code,"
where the plaintiff had to run a procedural gauntlet. "Everything is on the defendant's
side." Id. Louis' comments are especially poignant, and ironic, because his article is
widely credited as providing initial impetus for an analytical reformation of summaryjudgment procedure. See Louis, Doubtful Litigation, supra note 146.
216 Vairo, New Trends in Summary Judgment Practice, in ALI-ABA Course of
Study 103 (Feb. 1987).
167 See Risinger, Counter-Revolution, supra note 85, at 39 ("The Supreme Court
seems to have been numb to these 'price of admission' functions, particularly in Celotex,
and as a result has introduced a procedure which is asymmetrical, grossly favoring
defendants over plaintiffs no matter which party is the movant"); See generally Stempel,
A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment,
Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 95 (1988) (arguing that
recent Supreme Court decisions on summary judgment and directed verdict depart
greatly from the generally accepted understanding of their proper role).
163 See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (denying standing, the court asserted
a prudential limitation beyond the constitutional mandate of "case or controversy" that
the courts not hear a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by
all or a large class of citizens); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
169 Welch v. State Dep't of Highways & Public Trans., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (ex-
panding scope of state immunity under eleventh amendment, barring federal court Jones
Act suits against states).
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tiff's ability to litigate in the "public interest. 1 70 The jurisdic-
tional reach of federal and state courts over nonresidents has
been limited. 17' Heightened burdens of proof of subjective dis-
criminatory intent have restricted application of the equal pro-
tection clause. 72
In addition, utility of the public interest class action in
federal courts has been severely undercut.173 Snyder v. Harris, 74
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 75 and Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin76 erected high jurisdictional and notice barriers for
such class actions. Evans v. Jeff D.177 now enables class defen-
dants to require that plaintiff's class attorneys waive their right
to defendant payment of attorney's fees as a condition of
settlement. 178
Judicial construction of the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees
Awards Act' 79 undermines the Act's purpose in difficult cases
of arguable merit. Prevailing defendants can recover attorneys'
fees from plaintiffs without a showing of bad faith. 80 Moreover,
170 Reinhardt, Limiting Access to the Federal Courts: Round Up the Usual Victims,
6 Whittier L. Rev. 967, 968 (1984).
171 Recent decisions have limited state court in personam jurisdiction. Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales de Col-
ombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908
(1978). In 1988, Congress raised the amount in controversy requirement in diversity
actions from $10,000 to $50,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)-(b) (1982).
172 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 466 (a minority of the justices indicated that histori-
cally stigmatized groups that have recently gained a measure of legislative attention
may have, as a result, lost the protection of rigorous judicial scrutiny of harmful
government classification); Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 23.
173 Over 3000 federal class actions were filed in 1975 and just over 600 in fiscal year
1987, constituting a 500% decline. Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action
Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1988, at B7, col. 3.
7 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
'7- 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
176 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
1- 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
178 This places the interests of class attorneys and class members in conflict and
undermines attorney incentive for bringing public interest class actions.
179 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The Act, passed by Congress in 1976, entitles the
prevailing party in a civil rights action to recover its attorney's fees.
10 As intended, the Act opened the door to civil rights litigation as a means for
private enforcement of congressional policy. The Supreme Court, however, contrary to
statements of congressional intent, curbed the Act's impact on access by authorizing
payment of fees to prevailing defendants where the plaintiff's claim is "unreasonable"
even though not made in bad faith. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978). The language of the Act and the committee reports indicate that fees were to be
awarded to defendants only upon a much higher showing of "vexatiousness" or bad
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plaintiffs who succeed on the merits of their civil rights claims
cannot recover fees when damage or injunctive remedies are no
longer appropriate due to changes in circumstances after deci-
sion on substantive issues. 181
Novel constitutional positions can no longer be raised in
postappeal habeas corpus petitions. Apparently frustrated with
the expansion of post-conviction litigation, deemed civil in na-
ture, 182 the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane 83 closed court-'
house doors to a class of federal challenges to state convictions.
In an attempt to address dual concerns about increases in habeas
corpus filings and the extent of retroactive application of new
constitutional rules, the Court in Teague proscribed prisoners
from collaterally attacking their convictions by asserting legal
theories that extend or modify existing law. 184
Overall indicators thus point to two barriers to litigants
challenging entrenched social and political arrangements. First,
plaintiffs face a growing restriction of entry into the system.
Second, they face a decreased chance of receiving a full and
faith by the plaintiff. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, S. Rep.
No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
5908, 5912.
181 Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987) (plaintiff who obtains favorable decision
on merits of her substantive and procedural due process claims against prison officials
denied attorney's fees under § 1988 because, due to appeal delays, injunctive and
declaratory relief were no longer necessary and damages were inappropriate). See also
Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (civil rights defendant not liable for attorney's
fees incurred after a pretrial settlement offer where plaintiff's judgment is less than the
offer).
112 Habeas corpus proceedings are deemed civil even though they usually address
underlying criminal convictions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 thus applies to habeas corpus filings.
See United States v. Quin, 836 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1988).
183 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
114 As an efficiency measure the ruling makes eminent sense. It will eliminate many
filings. With minor exceptions it eliminates problematic twists to retroactivity principles.
The ruling is troublesome, however. Coupled with Rule 11, it is likely to deter attorneys
from asserting plausible arguments about the injustice of continued incarceration of
those on society's extreme margins who were convicted under laws that were ambiguous
and have since evolved. See Quin, 836 F.2d at 659. Teague also appears to be part of
an emerging procedural belief structure that accepts restrictions on the assertion of
novel theories as principal means of achieving systemic efficiency. See Penry v. Ly-
naugh, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4968 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The Teague plurality adopted for no adequate reason a novel threshold test
that ... precludes federal courts from considering a vast array of important
federal questions on collateral review, and thereby both prevents the vindica-
tion of personal constitutional rights and deprives our society of a significant
safeguard against future violations.
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fair hearing once in the system. 185 A value judgment is discern-
ible: in a system based on efficiency, plaintiffs outside society's
political and cultural mainstream asserting marginal claims are
expendable. Their participation in governmental process
through litigation is of insufficient value to warrant systemic
openness. Two prominent federal district court judges have
identified a related subtext to the "cheaper and quicker" mes-
sage of efficiency reforms. Judge Weinstein has observed an
"anti-access movement"' 186 Judge Carter has gone a step further,
suggesting that "doomsday cries of the efficiency mongers mask
a hidden agenda, an agenda that seeks to limit access to justice
of some rights holders but not others. 1 87
Recent reforms are likely to deter accent discrimination
challenges such as Fragante,18 8 denigrating the considerable
value of litigation process in those situations. 89 Employers
sometimes refuse to hire English-speaking immigrants because
of their accent. This is a significant problem of personal liveli-
hood for increasing numbers of permanent resident aliens and
naturalized citizens. They learn English as a second language
well enough to communicate with English-only speakers, but
are denied jobs for which they are qualified because employers
are troubled by their foreign accents. The stakes are high for
the immigrants. Challenges are exceedingly difficult. Gathering
hard factual proof of discriminatory intent is extremely difficult.
Employers control most relevant information. The substantive
law seems to allow employers to assert their patrons' likely
discomfort as a bona fide justification for not hiring. 90 File or
refrain from filing?
185 In addition to the reforms discussed, the 6-member jury, reduced from 12, and
the availability of peremptory juror challenges decrease the probability of minority
representation on juries. Fed. R. Civ. P. 48. See generally J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection
Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels (1977) (discussing the
importance and difficulty of achieving fair representation on juries).
Il6 Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the
Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1901, 1913, 1919 (1989) [hereinafter
Weinstein, Barriers to Justice] (suggesting that the reforms "may be misguided and
shortsighted").
187 Carter, supra note 83, at 2195.
,18 No. 87-2921. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
189 See infra notes 225-246 and accompanying text.
190 See infra note 192.
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After considerable research and debate, Fragante filed a
Title VII suit seeking both a remedy and a public explanation
of the city's actions.' 9' Fragante and his lawyers litigated the
case through trial and appeal. They lost. 92 The district court
found that Fragante had "extensive verbal communication skill
in English" but deferred to the city administrator's conclusion
that Fragante's accent justified denying him the position as
clerk. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting without serious dis-
cussion Fragante's theory that listener preference for nonac-
cented speech was an inappropriate basis for job denials.1 93
Despite the ultimate judgment, Fragante, his circle of close
supporters, and the local Filipino community benefitted from
the process of rights assertion. Many Filipinos identified with
Fragante's situation.194 His case became a rallying point for an
expanded group concerned about public education on both state
and local levels.195 It attracted people who perceived the case
as a reflection of a larger discriminatory attitude that society
and the established powers had not seriously acknowledged. 196
It contributed to a revamping of division interview procedures
to ensure freedom from cultural bias in future decisions. Fra-
191 Fragante's attorneys almost declined to file suit for two reasons: first, lack of
litigation resources, which was partially resolved through community fundraising and,
second, fear of assessment of attorney's fees and costs if they lost. After careful
research, the attorneys concluded that sanctions were not a substantial risk. See supra
notes 27-38.
192 The trial court made an equivocal finding that Fragante had a strong accent and
that public communication ability was a bona fide job requirement. Curiously, the court
did not expressly find that Fragante's accent was such that he lacked the ability to
communicate. The Ninth Circuit affirmed without discussing this omission. Fragante,
No. 87-2921, slip op. 1709, 1719-21. See Discrimination Ruling Is Felt In Hawaii,
Honolulu Star-Bulletin, July 18, 1989, at A-I, col. 2.
193 888 F.2d 591.
194 Two meteorological technicians prosecuted a similar suit against the National
Weather Service for job rejections based on their "pidgin English" accents. Suit Says
Men Rejected Because of 'Pidgin' Use, Honolulu Advertiser, Sept. 16, 1987, at A3,
col. 5.
M95 The case also attracted attention in San Francisco. A support group formed
there and raised funds and publicized issues. See Accent Case Under Appeal, Philippine
News (San Fransisco-San Jose edition), Aug. 17, 1988, at 3, col. 4; $2,000 Raised in
S.F. for Hawaiian Accent Battle, Asian Week, Aug. 26, 1988, at 11, col. 1; Fragante
Charges Foul in Filipino Accent Case, Asian Week, Apr. 14, 1989, at 9, col. 1.
"9 Community newspapers provide some indication of community interest. See,
e.g., Fragante Case, Hawaii Herald, Nov. 20, 1987, at 13, col. 1; Fragante: A Case of
Discrimination?, FilAm Courier, Mar. 1988, at 14; Does An Accent Justify Job Bias,
Asian Week, Feb. 26, 1988, at 3; Filipino Sues After Accent Costs Him A Job, Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, Feb. 6, 1989, Al, col. 5.
1990] Efficiency's Threat to Court Access for Minorities 381
gante's case also served as a catalyst for legislative lobbying
efforts and stimulated public recognition of the existence of civil
rights problems that were not being adequately addressed by
government agencies. This contributed concretely to the legis-
lative creation of a state civil rights commission with investi-
gative and enforcement powers. 197
Significantly, the principal filings in Fragante occurred be-
fore and during the early stages of efficiency procedural reform.
Fragante's lead litigation counsel recently observed that if re-
formed procedures had been in full effect in 1983, he probably
could not have afforded the escalated risk of litigating such a
marginal case. 198 He had a strong suspicion that subtle cultural
prejudice influenced the decision not to hire, but he had little
hard proof before filing. Lowered summary judgment thresholds
would have decreased the chance of a full public trial. Moreover,
heightened fact pleading requirements and liberally dispensed
sanctions for novel but failed theories would have created too
great a financial risk for his fledgling public interest firm. 199
II. A Traditional Values Framework for Evaluating Efficiency
Procedural Reforms
Part I concludes that efficiency procedural reforms dis-
courage minority access to courts for the assertion of rights
197 Interviews with William Hoshijo, Executive Director and principal attorney, Na
Loio No Na Kanaka (Lawyers for the People) (July 15, 1989 and Aug. 23, 1989).
According to Hoshijo, the Fragante Litigation Support Group later became a political
force behind the lobbying effort that resulted in passage of state legislation in 1988
creating a civil rights commission.
198 Hoshijo stated that if amended Rule 11 had been fully operative and applied in
the manner that it has been applied by many courts, his public interest firm probably
could not have afforded the risk of filing suit. He knew the suit advanced a novel legal
theory and rested upon certain yet to be discovered facts. Former Rule 11 presented
no problem, but amended Rule 11 would have. A Rule 11 monetary sanction very likely
would have shut down his public interest law firm. Id. Prior to filing in 1983, Hoshijo
had researched carefully the possibility of an assessment of attorney's fees and had
concluded at that time that the risk was nonexistent. Id. Fragante, noting procedural
obstacles erected since the filing of his suit, including the reordering of burdens of proof
of discriminatory intent, commented that "[t]he courts are putting the heaviest burden
on the people who have the least resources . . . . The more obstacles you place, the
more you discourage people from going through the hassles." Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
July 18, 1989, at 1, col. 4.
199 If that had been the situation, it is likely that there would have been no Fragante
litigation at all. Thus all the community benefits stemming from the litigation would not
have occured. Another illustration of this point, involving an extraordinary situation, is
the reopening of Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
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claims deemed marginal by prevailing law. How should those
reforms be evaluated? While there are several illuminating pos-
sibilities, this Article adopts the approach of value assessment,
examining the impact of the reform process on a range of values
linked to court access. This part explores reform in the context
of traditional procedural theory and the values associated with
that theory.2 °0
Part III offers expansion upon and analytic refinements to
traditional values analysis, suggesting that the traditional values
identified are an incomplete basis of evaluation. By contrast,
evolving procedural theory is shown to address the shortcom-
ings of traditional theory and provide a fuller range of values
for evaluating efficiency reforms that diminish minority access
to courts.
In 1912, Roscoe Pound urged study of the "actual social
effects of legal institutions and . . . doctrines. 201 Pound's call
for a rejection of classical formalism stimulated nearly eighty
years of richly textured writing that endeavored in often con-
flicting ways to ascertain and explain the origins and effects of
substantive law.202
200 1 use "traditional" expansively. There is no one traditional theory. There is no
clear line of demarcation between the traditional and modem. Generally, this part distills
various theories and views, many of which were themselves innovations, as a basis for
comparing recent developments in procedural thinking. "Classical legal thought" is
another term that has been used by historians to describe a mode of legal thinking from
the 1850's to the 1940's. See Kennedy, Toward an Understanding of Legal Conscious
hess: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 Res. in L. & Soc.
3 (1980); Trubek, Sociology of Civil Procedure, supra note 92, at 113 ("classical legal
thought still influences current thinking about procedure").
201 Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 Harv. L. Rev.
489, 516 (1912). Pound criticized employment of "the whole energy of ourjudicia system
...in working out a consistent, logical, minutely precise body of [precedent]" and
suggested that "the life of the law is in its enforcement."
202 Sociological jurisprudence in the early 1900's, legal realism, post-World War II
legal process theory, law and economics, liberal rights and critical theories of the 1970's
and 1980's are some of those schools of thought. For an overview, see White, From
Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early
Twentieth Century America, 58 Va. L. Rev. 999 (1972); Legal Scholarship: Its Nature
and Purposes, 90 Yale L.J. 955 (1981). Law and society proponents in particular urge
use of social science research methods to describe the actual operation of law in society
and to ascertain social effects. See generally Friedman, The Law and Society Movement,
38 Stan. L. Rev. 763 (1986); Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order:
Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev.
529, 567 (1977) (urging scholars to examine the actual impact of law on social groups);
Trubek, Where the Action Ki: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 Stan. L. Rev.
575, 587 (1984) (researching "what the law does in society").
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In contrast, procedural theory sustained comparatively spo-
radic growth in the period following Pound's suggestion. The
adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 reflected a commitment
to inexpensive decisions on the merits, opening a uniform and
accessible adjudicatory system to those excluded by the intri-
cacy and rigidity of common law and code pleading regimes.20 3
In the next decades, scholars largely eschewed critical inquiry
into the theoretical foundations of procedure. 2 4 This prompted
Hazard to observe that the "product of procedural scholarship
in the last twenty-five years is conspicuously bare of what might
be called the philosophy of procedure. '20 5
Ingrained beliefs about neutrality and procedural fairness
persisted. 20 6 Those beliefs had dual roots: first, in a longstanding
"drive for procedural uniformity"; 20 7 and, second, in the clean
separation of substance and procedure.
One dimension of the drive for uniformity has been identical
procedures among courts, that is, uniformity among federal dis-
trict courts; between state and federal courts; and within each
court concerning law and equity issues. 208 Another dimension
to uniformity has been the application of a single set of proce-
dures to all cases regardless of substance. Transsubstantive
rules are linked to the notion of procedural neutrality. That
notion is that uniform procedures do not by their terms favor
one type of claim over another or one group over another. They
are therefore value-neutral. They can be applied evenhandedly
203 See supra notes 76-82.
204 But see Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353
(1978) [hereinafter Fuller, Forms of Adjudication] (originally circulated in the late
1950's); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 630 (1958).
205 See G. Hazard, Jr., Research in Civil Procedure 63 (1963) (quoted in Burbank,
The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1463, 1464 n.9 (1987)
[hereinafter Burbank, Costs of Complexity]).
206 Graham, The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 929,
945 (1983). Graham suggests that these notions of uniformity are subconsciously ac-
cepted because a "lack of uniformity is a threat to the claim that procedure is a value-
free science." Id.
207 Id. at 944. See also Garth, supra note 71, at 169-70 (defining "procedural for-
malism" as "a system of rigid limits on the information that reaches the decision maker").
200 Subrin, How Equity Conquered Law, supra note 80. Subrin and others question
whether this type of uniformity is achievable or even desirable. Subrin, Federal Rules,
Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Pat-
terns, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1999, 2044-45 (1989) [hereinafter Subrin, Emerging Procedural
Patterns].
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by neutral judges without reference to competing substantive
values and hence are fair.209
Substantive norms are viewed as independent of procedural
rules. The function of procedure is instrumental. It ensures
efficient and neutral resolution of disputes by facilitating the
discovery of information and the application of substantive
norms to facts. Created by government authority, procedure is
litigant-neutral as well as substance-neutral. This view of pro-
cedural neutrality reflects a positivist view of law and is consis-
tent with the traditional model of private dispute adjudication. 210
Substantive legal rules are statements of the sovereign reflecting
conceptions of private ordering. The judge is an impartial arbiter
who rules upon issues formulated and information presented by
attorneys for individual parties. The goal of litigation is to return
the individual to the status quo as if no transgression had been
committed. Participation is individualized rather than represen-
tational.2I Procedure addresses form rather than content. Its
209 See Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 2067, 2074 (1989) (discussing "political neutrality" as a goal and outcome
of federal rulemaking). See infra notes 248, 260-266 for contrasting views.
220 Abram Chayes calls it the "traditional model." Chayes, Role of the Judge, supra
note 44, at 1283. Eskridge calls it the "Hobbesian Paradigm." Eskridge, Metaprocedure,
98 Yale L.J. 945, 955 n.32 (1989).
2M In the late 1950's, Lon Fuller also marshalled strong support for the traditional
private law model. His widely-read essay on the forms of adjudication argued for a
model of adjudication with goals confined to resolution of essentially private disputes
between individuals. Fuller, Forms of Adjudication, supra note 204, at 393-409. Group-
based claims, with representative litigants and publicly oriented disputes, polycentric
in structure, he maintained, could not be effectively handled by the adversarial system.
Courts, as the nonelective governmental branch with an accepted tradition limited to
private law adjudication, lacked moral authority to engage in political adjudication
affecting interests of nonparties. Id. Fuller championed individualized participation. He
theorized that "polycentric" problems, characterized by representational participation,
are not suited for adjudication because the solutions generated inevitably affect persons
who did not actually participate or fairly have their interests represented. Id. at 394-
95, Owen Fiss has contested Fuller's thesis of individualized participation:
[T]here is no explanation of why reason requires the kind of individual partic-
ipation that Fuller insists upon. In structural reform, reason enters the process,
not through the arguments of each and every individual affected, but through
the arguments of the spokesmen for all interests represented and through the
decision of the judge.
Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 42 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss,
Forms of Justice]. See also Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. &
Pub, Aff. 107, 147-56 (1976) (discussing a "group-disadvantaging" principle).
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role is strictly limited "to insur[ing] precision, uniformity and
certainty in the judicial application of substantive law. 212
In many respects, the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938 markedly improved upon existing procedural
systems by emphasizing decisions on the merits and by rejecting
a formalism enmeshed in technical complexity.2 13 In so doing,
however, the Rules embraced a formalist notion of the inherent
neutrality and fairness of carefully promulgated uniform rules.
According to Robert Bone, a "pragmatist" view of procedure in
the early twentieth century influenced the structure of the
rules .214 It emphasized convenience rather than abstract theories
of rights. It supported enlarged judicial discretion and looked to
case management by judges. And it retained a clear dividing
line between substance and procedure. The Rules Enabling Act
reflects this vision by commanding that the federal rules not
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.''215 Uniform
rules were perceived by many as "value-neutral. 21 6 Indeed,
Paul Carrington observes that "political neutrality" was and
continues to be a "paramount value" of the Federal Rules.2 17
In the late 1950's, the assumption of procedural fairness
gained further support from legal process theory developed by
Hart and Sacks. Legal process theory attempted to bridge the
gap created by legal realism's forceful rejection of classical
212 Bone, infra note 214, at 96 (discussing the views of Pound and Clark) and 88
(observing that Clark deemed it "analytically useful [although not conceptually funda-
mental] to divide procedure from substance, and he constantly insisted on an instru-
mental relationship between procedure and substantive law").
213 See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
214 Bone has described two theories underlying major procedural reforms of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, each of which embraces a notion of procedural
neutrality. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit
Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1989). A
"right-remedy" theory informed the structure of code procedures. A principal function
of procedure was to remedy the disruption of the natural order, defined by natural
substantive law, by restoring the injured litigant to the status quo. Id. at 98. The theory
embraced an instrumental function of procedure. Accepting a clear separation of sub-
stance and procedure, it assumed the essential neutrality of adjective law. The second
theory is the pragmatist theory.
21 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). See also supra note 210.
216 Bone, supra note 214, at 115.
217 Carrington, supra note 209, at 2074. The political neutrality of the Rules, in
terms of the original intention of the drafters and the effects of the Rules, has been
forcefully challenged. See Burbank, Transformation, supra note 114; Subrin, Emerging
Procedural Patterns, supra note 208; Subrin, How Equity Conquered Law, supra note
80; infra text accompanying notes 248, 260-266.
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formalism. 28 Realism deconstructed formalist categories and
reasoning processes and emphasized scrutiny of values and in-
terests. Legal realism thus blurred the clean divide between
substance and procedure. For some, realism portended a system
without normative guidance where judges decide disputes ac-
cording to personal perceptions of the "good life. '219
Legal process theory accepted significant legislative and
executive influence upon private affairs but rejected a moral
relativist view of law. In assuming that law could be fair, it
focused on process and not on substantive rights. 220 It assumed
that fairness was the by-product of rational procedures tailored
to institutional characteristics. 221 Institutional competence de-
termined institutional role. 222 The political branches best re-
21 Greatly simplified, legal realists studied "legal behavior" and posited that the
"law" is a product of human experience, values and goals, not logic, and that legal
principles are social constructs that both reflect and guide forms of social interaction.
K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960); Singer, supra
note 75, at 474. Realists exposed the general indeterminacy of rules and focused attention
on the goals and social effects of rules as a means of understanding their operation.
"Rights" emerged as socially created mechanisms for constraining individual freedom
through state force on the basis of value choices. Judicial method constrained judicial
process but did not dictate judicial outcomes.
Realist jurisprudence undermined the formalist distinction between private law,
based on a self-regulating market free from governmental interference, and public law,
based on issues of public concern susceptible to state intervention. It also convincingly
dashed the formalist notion that law is fixed according to some natural order and that
the law is always applied neutrally and equally, achieving rational outcomes. In place
of formalist notions, realists suggested a more "scientific" evaluation of conflicting
interests in light of competing values and desired social outcomes. Singer, supra note
75, at 502.
A primary criticism of the realists' approach was that it was insufficiently normative,
that it was essentially pragmatic and failed to provide meaningful guidance, and that
judges were therefore constrained only by their conscience and conception of the social
good. The supposed "steadying" influence of "a long-established judicial tradition" itself
seemed susceptible to realist critique. Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal
Thought, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 32 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
219 L. Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 121 (1986). But see Singer, supra note 75, at
471 ("The vision of opinions as nothing but post hoc rationalizations seriously misrep-
resents what most realists argued. The most convincing legal realists argued that the
reasoning demanded by judicial opinions substantially constrained judges.").
220 See generally Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law (tent. ed. 1958).
21 Legal process theory has been criticized for assuming the inherent capacity of
procedure to render just results. While it acknowledged the inadequacy of prerealist
formalism with respect to substantive law, it embraced a kind of procedural formalism,
which masked the extent of substantive value choices in decisionmaking. See Mensch,
supra note 218, at 30.
222 Singer, supra note 75, at 506.
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solved public policy controversies. Courts, armed with litigation
procedures, were especially competent to adjudicate factual dis-
putes and render fair decisions for private litigants.
Generally stated, traditional procedural theory tended to
focus on individual participation in the judicial resolution of
private disputes, to separate procedure from substance, and to
link uniform, facially neutral procedures with fairness. The con-
ceptual divide between substance and procedure and the as-
sumption of the fairness of uniform procedures tended to "un-
dervalue the most important type of uniformity-uniformity of
result. '223 Scholars relegated inquiries about legal results and
social impact to the realm of substantive law.
Traditional procedural values relating to court access are
located generally within this setting.224 Those values are dis-
cussed in the remainder of this part as a departure point for
evaluating recent procedural reforms. While efficiency analysis
links the legitimacy of the litigation process to the inexpensive
and accurate application of substantive law to the facts of cases,
traditional values analysis roots legitimacy in a broader range
of values. Litigation process is legitimized by procedures that
ensure the effectuation of individual rights, that recognize the
significance of dignity and individual participation in the peace-
ful resolution of disputes, and that foster a sense of fairness on
the part of litigants and the public.
A. Procedure and Effectuation
A principal purpose of procedure is effectuation, that is,
procedure is the means through which individuals "are enabled
22 Subrin, Emerging Procedural Patterns, supra note 208, at 2047.
21 In an influential article proposing free access to courts for indigents, Frank
Michelman identified four discrete, yet interrelated, traditional litigation values: dignity,
participation, deterrence, and effectuation. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Liti-
gation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, 1973 Duke L. Rev. 1153, 1172-
73 [hereinafter Michelman, Access Fees]. I have adopted Michelman's general definition
of "values." The term is generally synonymous with "ends, interest, purposes." Id. at
1172. See also Mashaw, supra note 61, at 46-47; Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the
Right to Be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 449
(1974); Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process
Values", 60 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1974); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 269 (1975).
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to get, or are given assurance of having" whatever society "re-
gards as rightfully theirs. 22 5 "Rights" are statements of rela-
tional expectations between individuals, on the one hand, and
between individuals and the state, on the other, that are enforce-
able by state authority. The effectuation value of procedure is
realized when procedure facilitates the accurate application of
substantive law and enables litigants to enforce their rights.
When an individual's rights are enforced, a complementary
value of "deterrence" is also furthered.226
Efficiency reforms implicitly accept effectuation as the ov-
erriding procedural value. As discussed, the touchstone for ef-
ficiency is the winner. Those who are likely to effectuate their
substantive rights belong in the system. Those who are not, do
not. Both efficiency and accuracy are promoted by procedures
that excise early on those who are asserting tenuous rights
claims.
B. Procedure, Individual Dignity, and Participation
Dignity values reflect concern for the "humiliation and loss
of self-respect" that a person suffers when denied entry into the
legal system. 2 7 Dignity is most clearly offended when a person
believes that she is the victim of governmental arbitrariness or
private abuse and is barred at the courthouse door or forced to
participate without assistance or resources. 228 A typical example
is the person whose welfare benefits are terminated without
explanation and who lacks resources to challenge the termina-
tion formally.
Philosophers of varying orientations view individual dignity
as the wellspring of a functioning, humane society.229 Richard
225 Michelman, Access Fees, supra note 224, at 1173.
216 Deterrence shapes the behavior of rights violators in "ways thought socially
desirable." Id. at 1154 (noting that deterrence values might also be appropriately labeled
"social welfare values").
227 Id. at 1172.
2
,8 Id. at 1173.
229 Philosophers have long recognized human dignity as a primary moral value of
democratic societies. See Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 703 (1980). John Rawls, among others, advanced a theory of justice embodying
the notion of personal dignity. He posited that implicit in social contract theory is the
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Saphire refers to a sense of well-being derived from the process
by which decisions are reached, independent of substantive
outcomes, as "inherent dignity. 2 30 There are two philosophical
corollaries to this view. First, fairness in relations between gov-
ernment and the individual cannot be defined solely in terms of
outcomes or even in terms of the fact-producing mechanisms
upon which those outcomes depend. Rather, the tenor of the
interaction itself is important. Second, the individual's percep-
tions of and feelings about the effects of governmental processes
must be taken into account in assessing legitimacy. 231
Expressing one's views in a public forum links dignity and
participation. Participation values reflect an appreciation of "lit-
igation as one of the modes in which persons exert influence,
or have their wills counted, in societal decisions they care
about. ' 232 The core supposition is that state coercion must be
legitimized not only by acceptable substantive policies, but by
political processes that respond to a democratic society's de-
mand that individuals participate in decisions affecting their
daily lives.233 Independent of the results achieved, "the partici-
view that formation of societies and governments is prompted by a need, basic to all,
to preserve individual dignity and autonomy, both moral and physical. J. Rawls, A
Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls drew upon John Locke's principle that the loss of
freedom from arbitrary power is the loss of the dignity essential to life. See J. Locke,
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1894). This is consistent with the Kantian
rejection of society's treatment of the individual as a means, instead of as an end. The
government's fair treatment of the'individual is a value unto itself; it is a predicate to
instilling the feelings of dignity and self-respect essential to healthy social interaction
and workable social organization. See Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian
Injunction, 18 Nomos 172 (1977).
210 Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach
to Procedural Protection, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111, 121 (1978).
131 Recent sociopsychological studies support these suppositions. See infra notes
240-243.
232 According to Michelman, the rudimentary importance of participation vhlues in
a democratic society suggests a broad constitutional right of court access. Michelman,
Access Fees, supra note 224, at 1172. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30
(1963) (minority group association for the purpose of legal challenges may be a form of
political expression protected by the associational component of the first amendment).
23 Mashaw, supra note 61, at 30. Pincoffs aptly highlights this point:
Community consists in this: that no one can rightly complain of being used by
another .... The obvious safeguard against such use is that the person enter
meaningfully into the consultation about what is to be done to him, for him
and with him. Revelation to him of the reasons for the proposed action, and
his participation in the assessment of those reasons are then necessary condi-
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patory roles provided for in legal processes... afford" a desired
"measure of self-determination. '234
Viewed from the perspective of an individual like Fragante
who is refused a job due to his accent and who may be later
deterred from bringing suit to challenge the social norms under-
lying that refusal, efficiency reforms deprive him of his only
meaningful forum for "having his will counted." His loss of an
employment opportunity is compounded by society's failure to
afford him a chance to participate in the creation and enforce-
ment of legal understandings giving rise to that loss. 235
Efficiency reforms that restrict court access for plaintiffs
asserting marginal claims or novel legal theories thus tend to
further effectuation values but disserve values of individual
dignity and participation. In so doing, efficiency reforms draw
into conflict traditional views of justice for individuals. From a
utilitarian perspective, some indignity suffered by a minority of
the populace is an unavoidable and tolerable result of system
shrinkage in the interest of efficiency. From a perspective of
justice that defines what is "right" in terms of individual auton-
omy and freedom, the indignity resulting from the exclusion of
individuals with marginal claims is unacceptable. 236 Traditional
procedural values analysis highlights the conflict but does not
provide clear means for resolving it.
C. Procedure and Peaceful Resolution of Disputes
Traditional procedural analysis values "inclusion" provided
that participation is peaceful. Peacefulness in the resolution of
tions of meaningful consultation-consultation that is not merely a blind for
action that takes no account of him, his interest, his desires.
Pincoffs, supra note 229, at 179-80. Fuller links the moral legitimacy of adjudication
directly to the opportunity of the individual to participate in the process. Fuller, Forms
of Adjudication, supra note 204, at 394-95.
234 Summers, supra note 224, at 22.
211 The emphasis on the individual in traditional values analysis ignores to an extent
group participation values, which are also significantly impacted by efficiency reforms.
See also Fuller, Forms of Adjudication, supra note 204.
236 See Rawls, supra note 229. Rawls argues that the collective good cannot take
precedence over the autonomy and freedom of the individual. "Each person possesses
an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society cannot override
.... The rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the
calculus of social interests." Id. at 3-4.
In important respects, traditional dignity and participation analysis, with its focus
on the individual, underplays the effects of procedural reform upon social groups. See
htfra notes 247-287 and accompanying text.
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disputes is something "[m]ost people in Western societies take
... for granted" because "peace and repose are simply prefer-
able to strife and tension."'237 Of course, some "peaceful" pro-
cedures are violent and oppressive in consequence; for example,
the death penalty. And the civil rights movement has demon-
strated that agitation and resistance are sometimes more effec-
tive than resort to peaceful but biased procedures. Nevertheless,
the notion persists that in a "well-ordered society" a routinized
peaceful process is "generally preferable even when its results
are somewhat less good than those realizable" through other
means 238
Efficiency procedural reforms that diminish court access
for public interest and minority litigants might be viewed as
encouraging forcible protest and therefore disserving the value
of peacefulness in dispute resolution. Overt public resistance,
however, seems an unlikely generalized consequence of proce-
dural reform, especially in light of the subtlety of the reforms,
their apparent neutrality, and the incremental nature of their
exclusionary effects. Nevertheless, collective alienation and
frustration over time, without peaceful outlet, can be channeled
by specific events into violence against perceived oppressors.
Protest outside the courts, attributable to lack of court access
in a given instance, is a potential catalyst for explosive behavior
rooted in simmering group frustration. Forcible protest is en-
couraged, or at least not discouraged, by reforms when groups
perceive that their grievances are not even likely to be addressed
let alone redressed by those with decisional power.
D. Procedure and Citizen Assent
A peaceful and orderly adjudicatory system may still lack
political legitimacy if "it does not have the assent or acquies-
cence of citizens. '239 In principle, assent may be inferred from
a citizen's acceptance of societal benefits or from his represen-
tative's participation in the formation and operation of the dis-
237 Summers, supra note 224, at 22-23.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 21. See generally J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (T. McCarthy trans.
1975) [hereinafter Habermas, Legitimation Crisis] (discussing criticisms of the legal
system and its crisis of legitimacy).
392 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 25
pute resolution system. In practice, sociopsychological studies
indicate that perceptions of procedural fairness are essential to
citizen assent. E. Allen Lind and Tom Tyler's recent research
indicates that a litigant's sense of justice is determined as much,
if not more, by perceptions of procedural fairness than by sub-
stantive results.2 40 Laurens Walker, Lind, and John Thibaut's
study similarly indicates that for individual litigants, generally
desirable ends do not justify undesirable means, but procedural
fairness greatly enhances acceptance of a wide range of
outcomes.241
According to these studies, perceptions of procedural fair-
ness are linked to participants' opportunities for expressing per-
sonal views to attentive authority.2 42 Accessibility is key. By
reducing cost and delay, efficiency reforms may enhance the
perception of procedural fairness for those allowed to partici-
pate. Less expensive, more responsive procedures benefit par-
ticipants. Because the reforms appear hospitable to mainstream
claims, many are likely to perceive reforms as enhancing pro-
cedural fairness. For those deterred from participating, how-
ever, reforms undermine beliefs in systemic fairness.
Is it acceptable to enhance perceptions of fairness for the
majority in a manner that fosters perceptions of unfairness for
a minority? 43 If the majority vastly outnumbers the minority,
the system is likely to function more efficiently and overt public
resistance is unlikely.244 Utility theory therefore suggests that
the trade-off is acceptable. Social contract theory suggests, how-
ever, that the legitimacy of the process is based on the assent
of all citizens, especially of those with minimal influence upon
the structure and operation of the system.245 Again, traditional
values analysis highlights the conflict but does not resolve it.
240 Lind & Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice 207-15 (1988).
241 Walker, Lind & Thibaut, The Relation Betveen Procedural and Distributive
Justice, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1401, 1416-17 (1979).
242 Lind & Tyler, supra note 240, at 207-10.
243 The question is useful because it poses the issue within a utilitarian framework
seemingly adopted by some reformers. The question is oversimplified because it assumes
that the majority will define its interests and the larger social good without reference to
the potentially conflicting interests of minorities.
144 See supra notes 237-238 and accompanying text.
245 Rawls, supra note 229 (theorizing that differential treatment in terms of distri-
butive justice can only be justified if it works to the benefit of society's disadvantaged
and that the inviolability of the individual precludes any utilitarian preference for ig-
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Viewed broadly, efficiency procedural reforms both en-
hance and detract from systemic legitimacy. They most clearly
further effectuation values by enabling participants to get "what
is rightfully theirs." While mainstream claimants realize the ben-
efits of efficiency improvements, marginal claimants are likely
to perceive the system as increasingly inhospitable to their griev-
ances. The value of individual participation along with the val-
ues of peaceful dispute resolution and dignity argue for increas-
ing court access particularly for individuals without other
meaningful avenues of protest.
When recent procedural reforms are subjected to an effi-
ciency analysis, a mode of analysis criticized for failing to con-
sider a wide range of relevant values, the reforms seem sensible
if not salutary. 246 When subjected to traditional multivalue anal-
ysis, the appropriateness and desirability of the reforms are
called sharply into question.
III. Developments in Procedural Theory
This section suggests that traditional values analysis is itself
incomplete. Developments in procedural theory have under-
scored the shortcomings of traditional theory including its nar-
row emphasis on the individual and on private dispute resolu-
tion; its separation of substance and procedure; its assumption
of procedural neutrality and fairness; and its refusal to examine
social effects. Recent developments in theory offer a range of
procedural values in addition to efficiency that are of special
relevance to minorities seeking court access and that enhance
our evaluation of procedural reforms. Some of those values are
analytic refinements to traditional values. Some are drawn from
evolving procedural theory, rights theory, feminist philosophy
and minority litigation experience. These may be viewed as new
values in the context of procedure. Collectively, they support
the proposition that accessible courts for minorities asserting
noring the individual to further the common good). See supra note 236. In addition, the
Kantian emphasis on individual autonomy leads to a conclusion of moral legitimacy
only if dignity is preserved for each affected person, raising the larger issue of the
primacy of the individual "right" over the collective "good." See M. Sandel, Liberalism
and the Limits of Justice (1982).
246 See supra note 224.
394 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 25
marginal rights claims are integral to a functioning, humane legal
system in a society committed to democratic ideals.
In the last fifteen years, the language of procedure has
undergone dramatic evolution. Descriptions of new dispute res-
olution systems, analyses of altered procedures and explana-
tions of expanded foundations of adjudication have developed
new terminology. The language of procedural theory has also
changed. Reflecting a shift in the scope of inquiry, the language
of philosophy, economics, psychology and political science now
appear in procedural discourse. 247 Recent scholarship stresses
meaningful interpretation of procedural rules through inquiry
into the social contexts of rule formulation and application,
rejecting traditional notions of procedure as self-contained, neu-
tral, and internally consistent. 248 It examines values embraced
by various structures of procedure, 249 yielding three general
developments relevant to the present inquiry.
A. Rejecting the Notion of the Autonomous Litigant
First, traditional theory's tight focus on the autonomous
litigant-reflected in concern about the effectuation of individual
rights, the individual's perception of fairness, individual dignity,
and individual participation-has been broadened to encompass
the impact of procedure on social groups. The litigant is no
longer objectified as a necessarily "fully constituted, self-con-
tained actor capable of autonomous choice." 250 The litigant's
relations with people, groups, and institutions are essential to
an understanding of the nature of the dispute and the rights
asserted. Scholarship has explored the community-building as-
247 See Eskridge, supra note 210, at 949 n.23 (compiling a list of "notable examples
of interdisciplinary borrowing").
218 See Burbank, Costs of Complexity, supra note 205, at 1472-74 (1987); Eskridge,
supra note 210, at 949 (we "cannot understand the Rules without understanding their
interrelationship with social and economic oppression, human psychology and economic
incentives"); Cover, Fiss & Resnik, Procedure (1980).
249 Two influential books examining structures of procedure are R. Cover & 0.
Fiss, The Structure of Procedure (1979) and the casebook, Cover, Fiss & Resnik, supra
note 248. For an insightful critique of the latter, see Eskridge, supra note 210.
250 Trubek, Sociology of Civil Procedure, supra note 92, at 111, 119-21.
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pects of rights assertion and law.2 1 The equal protection doc-
trine's emphasis on differential power in group relations and the
marked increase in public law litigation, including representa-
tional suits, have impelled procedural recognition of the status
of groups 25 2 "Groups" do not refer to voluntary organizations
but to "attribution or status groups, in which membership arises
from biology, heritage, personal trait or social position. ' '253
Membership in these groups "carries a baggage of socially con-
structed meaning beyond the brute factual reality of the identi-
fying traits. ' '254
Inquiry has become increasingly sensitive to the effect of
litigation process on group relations characterized by an imbal-
ance of power. Sometimes individuals are aggrieved because of
their membership in a group disfavored by members of main-
stream society. The qualified African-American employee de-
nied a promotion because of the employer's policy of promoting
only whites asserts a rights claim for herself and on behalf of
other nonwhite employees. The affront is group directed. The
remedy may yield group benefits. Procedural theory unequivo-
cally recognizes group-based social behavior and the appropri-
ateness of corresponding group-based rights litigation.
.The evolution is most noticeable with respect to participa-
tion values. Fuller's commitment to individualized participation
is generally recognized as outdated.255 He argued in the 1950's
21 See supra notes 235-236. See also Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability)
of Law in a Contradictory World, 28 Nomos 71, 92 (1986) (a right asserted, "however
much it may be a claim to respect of a distinct person, is, equally fundamentally, a
claim grounded in human association"); Minow, Listening the Right Way (Book Re-
view), 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 946, 956 (1989) [hereinafter Minow, Listening]. Theorists
such as Rawls build a system of justice upon each individual's freedom and autonomy.
Society's powerful cannot act in a just manner as long as they denigrate the interests
of those individuals less powerful to further their own interests. See Rawls, supra note
229. Sandel and others have refuted the notion of the disembodied individual, arguing
that the individual is constituted by her relations to communities to which she is bonded.
Communitarian relations, in the broadest sense, are integral to notions ofjustice. Sandel,
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, supra note 245.
23 See generally Lawrence, supra note 23.
25 Michelman, The Meanings ofLegal Equality, Harv. BlackLetter J. 24, 27 (Spring
1986) ("Equality comes clearly into its own as a distinct constitutional norm... when
we envision society as composed not just of atomic individuals but also, in part, of
groups that in turn are composed of individuals.").
25 Id.
25 See generally S. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modem Class
Action (1987); Chayes, Role of the Judge, supra note 44.
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that representational suits are inappropriate for adjudication be-
cause the solutions generated inevitably affect persons who have
not kictually participated in the litigation .2 6 The more generally
accepted view now is that in current group-based litigation,
"spokesmen for all interests" represent the interests of non-
party individuals .257
B. Challenging Assumptions of Neutrality
Second, scholars and jurists generally acknowledge now
that procedure is neither value-free nor a science.7 8 In creating
or reforming a procedural system, people bring to bear particular
viewpoints not only about specific procedural rules but also
about substantive issues and fundamental purposes of adjudi-
cation. These viewpoints shape their sense of a system's appro-
priate scope, costs and benefits, which affects their structuring
and operation of the system. This in turn shapes the system's
substantive impact. 59
Uniform rules of procedure are thus no longer viewed as
inherently substance-neutral or litigant-neutral in operation.260
Instead, the line between substance and procedure has blurred.
In their influential book, Robert Cover and Owen Fiss address
256 Fuller, Forms of Adjudication, supra note 204, at 394-95.
'7 Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 211. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, supra note 211, at 148-54 (discussing a "group-disadvantaging" principle).
25 See Graham, supra note 206, at 945. The debate is by no means over. Some of
it has been acerbic. Carrington's description of the Rules Enabling Act's "aspiration of
political neutrality" and his defense of transsubstantive rules, see Carrington, supra
note 209, at 2067-87, has met with strident criticism. Burbank states that "Professor
Carrington is alert to the costs of departing from the appearance of 'political neutrality'
but deaf to the costs of. . . procedural subterfuge." Burbank, Transformation, supra
note 114, at 1935. Burbank also argues that substance-specific procedures and empirical
investigation into effects are an "anathema" to Carrington's view of neutrality because
the former attracts political attention and the latter produces "data on the experience
under the Rules [that] may cause organized groups to realize that they have a stake and
hence to regard the 'neutral' rule as a legitimate object of political interest." Id. at 1936.
29 See Subrin, Emerging Procedural Patterns, supra note 208, at 2046 (procedural
rules do not "work in a vacuum . . . . The habits and customs of the bench and bar,
the procedural rules, and the economic, social and political agendas of the lawyers,
clients, judge and other court personnel interact with one another"); see also Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 80, at 966.
1w Subrin's research indicates that procedural reform has always had a substantial
political dimension. See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 80,
at 909-1002 (documenting the political underpinnings of both the Field Code and the
Federal Rules).
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valuing process and the interdependence of substance and pro-
cedure. 261 Procedural form and substantive results are at times
inextricably bound. 262 Procedural discretion is viewed as a po-
tential "instrument of power."2 63 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recently acknowledged that "rules of procedure have important
effects on substantive rights of litigants. ' '264 A rule structured to
deter all frivolous filings may be neutral by its terms and never-
theless partial in its effects. Certain types of potential litigants
may be more severely impacted because their social situation
generates disproportionate numbers of claims deemed frivolous
by current norms. 265
In critiquing the procedural system, we therefore ask: who
formulates the rules?; who interprets and applies them?; who
26i R. Cover & 0. Fiss, supra note 249. See also Cover, Fiss & Resnik, Procedure,
supra note 248.
262 As a result, momentum has gathered for the creation of "substance-specific" or
non-transsubstantive procedures. See, e.g., Subrin, Emerging Procedural Patterns,
supra note 208, at 2042.
26 Burbank, Costs of Complexity, supra note 205, at 1471. To fashion rules of
sufficient generality to encompass all cases, the Federal Rules scheme has vested
considerable discretion in trial judges. This has enabled judges to "do justice" in many
instances. But wide-ranging judicial discretion over pleadings, joinder, discovery, and
settlements, coupled with open and costly discovery controlled by attorneys, has also
transformed procedural rules into potential "instruments of power." Id. This power is
wielded by judges and litigants. How this power is exercised by judges in deciding close
cases depends upon the extent of their allegiance to broadly framed systemic constraints
(such as precedent and adherence to perceived "purposes" of the Rules) and to personal
notions of how judges should think about the interests involved and the values at stake.
See Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 43, at 416.
24 Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 665 (1989) (footnote omitted). The
notion of procedural influence on substantive outcome challenges traditional assump-
tions and raises descriptive and normative questions. To what extent does procedure
undermine formal substantive law? Has substance-sensitive procedure created unpre-
dictability in the process? How should procedural influence be viewed normatively?
See Cover, Reading the Rules: Procedural Neutrality and Substantive Efficacy, 84 Yale
L.J. 718 (1975).
265 Judge Carter recently observed that Rule 11 has been applied in a manner
evincing "extraordinary substantive bias." Carter, supra note 83, at 2192. See Subrin,
Emerging Procedural Patterns, supra note 208, at 2050 ("many individual procedural
rules or clusters of rules have an inherently political aspect, in that they favor or disfavor
types of litigants"); Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974).
Burbank suggests that once we accept the non-neutral effect of procedural rules,
our task is "to be candid in describing that impact ... and in describing the purposes
of the ... rules." A system is not dysfunctional because its mechanisms require value
choices. Danger lies not in the reality of value choices but in the formalistic refusal to
acknowledge their influence in the process. The concern is that "substantive policy
choices will be buried, a concern that implicates . . . democratic values." Burbank,
Costs of Complexity, supra note 205, at 1473. For a critique of the procedural formalism
implicit in legal process theory, see supra note 221.
398 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 25
benefits?; who is harmed?; what substantive values are impli-
cated?; how does the system's treatment of a dispute transform
the parties' and the public's perceptions of substantive rights?;
what are case-specific effects?; and what are long-term cumu-
lative consequences, particularly with respect to group rela-
tions? These and related questions signal increasing inquiry into
a "critical sociology of civil procedure." 266
C. Acknowledging the Role of Adjudication in the
Development of Public Values
Third, current procedural theories acknowledge the contri-
bution of litigation procedure to the development and articula-
tion of public values. In contrast, traditional theory emphasized
procedures designed to resolve disputes between private par-
ties.2 67 Recent scholarship criticizes the traditional private law
model of adjudication as anachronistic. It fails to account for a
significant public law dimension to adjudication that arises out
of the structure of a postindustrial, multicultural democratic
society. 268 Although scholars differ with respect to theoretical
266 See Carrington, Foreword: The Scientific Study of Legal Institutions, 51 Law
and Contemp. Probs. 1, 4-6 (1989) [hereinafter Carrington, Scientific Study]. As early
as the 1920's, realists inspired considerable empirical research into legal institutions.
Intense scrutiny of the qualitative effects of procedure, however, is a relatively recent
phenomenon. The sophistication and acceleration of empirical study of civil procedure
in recent years can be linked to developments in procedural theory, the "maturation of
social science," and enlarged institutional capacity. See Trubek, Sociology of Civil
Procedure, supra note 92.
See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
Beginning with Chayes' 1976 article on the emergence of public law litigation as
a distinct mode of adjudication, the role of courts in social change has been debated.
Chayes, Role of the Judge, supra note 44, at 1283-84.
Cases of public importance have been adjudicated by courts throughout history,
and the Supreme Court has made pronouncements of immense public significance since
its inception. A public dimension to adjudication has thus always existed. "Public law
litigation" is something distinct, however. According to Chayes and others, its emer-
gence as a model of litigation that has impacted significantly upon the daily functions
of courts is marked by greatly increased numbers of filings seeking legal and equitable
remedies by an expanded array of claimants raising issues of public concern in a
considerably widened field of subject matters. Id. Ethnic minorities, women, people
with disabilities, homeless people, and environmentalists, among others, have chal-
lenged government practices and social arrangements according to newly recognized
legislative policies and evolving constitutional doctrines.
The private law model explained adjudication for a social and political setting
markedly different from American society of the last 35 years. It was a setting without
an encompassing "regulatory welfare state." See S. Breyer & R. Stewart, Administrative
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foundations, and some argue that less judicial involvement in
public law matters is desirable, 269 they generally agree that the
purpose of adjudication has evolved into "something more than
dispute resolution among individuals about private matters." 270
Public law litigation seeks to influence future institutional
behavior271 and often involves "a struggle among various con-
ceptions of what solution ... [is] in the public interest, not just
a battle among private interests. '272 Rather than attempt to re-
capture the status quo as does private law litigation under tra-
ditional theory, public law litigation seeks to "transform rela-
tionships in a publicly desirable way. 2 73
The public law dimension to adjudication builds upon tra-
ditional political theory embracing a separation of powers ideal.
That political theory is concerned with the potential for oppres-
sion of the powerless inherent in the pure form of majoritarian
rule.2 74 One function of the courts is to hold government's elec-
Law and Regulatory Policy 1, 28 (2d ed. 1985). Citizens did not charge that government
bureaucracies had been "captured" by the businesses they regulated, failing to protect
the beneficiaries of regulatory programs. See R. Fellmeth, The Interstate Commission
Omission, The Public Interest, and the I.C.C. (1970); T. Lowi, The End of Liberalism
(1969). Individuals rarely sued private businesses to hold them accountable to public
standards or government agencies for their own failures and excesses. The setting for
the private law model also did not reflect litigation needs of an established "welfare and
social services state." S. Breyer & R. Stewart, supra, at 36. That era was also unfamiliar
with the kind of civil rights activism that indelibly marked the late 1950's through 1970's.
That activism strategically blended marches, lobbying, and litigation and resulted in
legislation that recognized public rights of minorities and authorized private suits to
enforce social policies.
269 See, e.g., Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 48.
270 Eskridge, Metaprocedure, supra note 210, at 986.
271 Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 211. This contrasts sharply with the private
law model. The private law model's implicit premise is that "public law" disputes about
appropriate changes to the status quo, including challenges to government action, are
to be resolved by overtly political executive agencies or legislatures. Courts are not
competent to rule on such matters and, as the ostensibly nonpolitical branch of govern-
ment, lack legitimizing authority to do so. See Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process, supra
note 220.
272 Eskridge, supra note 210, at 957.
273 Id. at 958.
24 One traditional view of minority rights is steeped in political theory about the
proper balance between majoritarian political processes and individual liberties. The
elective branches of government, responsive to political constituencies, enact and en-
force laws for the general good. Individual interests are subordinated unless they entail
liberties deemed essential to democracy by the American polity via the Constitution.
Majoritarian processes pose an inherent risk to those in the minority. Minorities, by
one general definition, see Ely, supra note 60, lack political clout and the capacity to
form ready coalitions to acquire influence to ensure fair treatment by those in power.
According to this view, the judiciary is the "bastion of individual rights" and the
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tive branches* accountable to constitutional standards and pro-
tect "discrete and insular minorities" from intemperate majori-
ties. 27" Especially -where the political will of the majority
encourages restriction of minority liberties, an accessible judi-
ciary furthers societal interests and, in particular, those of the
minority, by providing a formal public forum for testing govern-
ment conduct according to constitutional ideals. 276 Rights asser-
tion is the mechanism for triggering judicial scrutiny.277
This separation of powers concept acknowledges the prac-
tical shortcomings of the interest group model of government
decisionmaking, which argues against judicial intervention in
public law matters. 278 The hypothetical marketplace of ideas
results in truly representative outcomes only if decisionmakers
are looking singularly for ideas. In the crowded, tumultuous
political world, however, decisionmakers often are looking also
to elicit and maintain political support from powerful consti-
tuencies. Those proponents of ideas backed by little constituent
provider of "much-needed protection against arbitrary governmental action." Reinhardt,
supra note 170, at 967. This view emanates from a rejection of what Hart calls moral
populism-that "democracy entails acceptance of the view that the majority have a
moral right to dictate how all should live." H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 54
(1963). The central flaw of moral populism, according to Hart, "is a failure to distinguish
the acceptable principle that political power is that entrusted to the majority from the
unacceptable claim that what the majority do with that power is beyond criticism and
must never be resisted." Id. A political minority's only means of resistance through
governmental process may be the judicial system.
275 According to former Chief Justice Stone's formulation of the judicial role vis-a-
vis minorities in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938), "discrete and insular minorities," due to their exclusion from political pro-
cesses, must resort to the court for protection from intemperate majorities-hence the
justification for heightened judicial scrutiny. For insightful analysis of footnote four, see
Cover, Judicial Activism, supra note 59. See also Lawrence, Unconscious Racism,
supra note 23. For criticism of the theoretical foundations of footnote four see Acker-
man, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985) (examining the moral
legitimacy and efficacy of careful judicial review); Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts and
the Fate of "Insider-Outsider", 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291 (1986).
276 See Hart, supra note 274, at 86 ("[No one should think even when popular
morality is supported by an 'overwhelming majority' or marked by widespread intol-
erance, indignation and disgust, that loyalty to democratic principles requires him to
admit that its imposition on a minority is justified").
277 "The vindication of the rights of the poor and the powerless, those most in need
of government protection" has been the "historic function" of the federal judiciary.
Reinhardt, supra note 170, at 968.
278 Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007,
1014 (1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Statutory Interpretation] (the "optimistic pluralism"
concept "leaves the selection of overall values to the legislature" with conviction that
legislative choice among competing interests will "generally produce.., good policies").
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power have only their ideas to offer in a market that values
much more. As a result, those without substantial access to
power are ineffectual in the legislative and bureaucratic realms.
Instead, they seek court access.
Rooted in the separation of powers concept is the idea that
a function of adjudication is to "protect public rights. '279 The
judicial process is viewed as "an effective mechanism for fur-
thering societal interests through the enforcement of the rights
of aggrieved individuals. '280 It permits "ad hoc application of
broad national policy in situations of limited scope. '28 1 Whether
a government hiring scheme is discriminatory, a county's elec-
toral structure constitutes gerrymandering, or welfare benefits
have been improperly terminated, all involve disputes about
"rights" of both the individual directly involved and the group
indirectly affected. Individual litigants are deemed private at-
torneys general attempting to vindicate societal interests re-
flected in constitutional and legislative policies. 282
This concept assumes a procedural system hospitable to
debate about the existence, scope, and enforcement of public
rights.2 3 It rejects as unrealistically limited the traditional mod-
el's focus on private dispute resolution. The added administra-
tive burdens on courts and costs for institutional defendants are
deemed acceptable because they serve the traditional values of
deterring rights violations and enhancing popular participation
in the process. 28 4
In addition to resolving disputes about the enforcement of
specific public rights, adjudication is also viewed as a "process
29 See Eskridge, supra note 210, at 961 ("The Cover, Fiss and Resnik thesis is that
procedural rules should be tailored to protect public rights.").
no Chayes, Role of the Judge, supra note 44.
281 Id.
282 City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring).
2 The Cover, Fiss and Resnik casebook is viewed as embodying a perspective that
judicial choices "must often be evaluated by standards of public justice, and not by
private convenience or mere efficiency" and that "when public rights are involved...
courts have an obligation to mold procedural requirements to meet public needs."
Eskridge, supra note 210, at 959-60.
28 See supra note 226. Reflecting this perspective, Justice Stevens in Talamani v.
All-State Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1071 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring), sharply rebuked
judges with a fast punitive hand, noting that "freedom of access of the courts is a
cherished value in our democratic society .... There is, and should be, the strongest
presumption of open access to all levels of the judicial system."
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by which we develop and articulate public values. 2 85 Fiss sug-
gests that this is an element of traditional theory-that a function
of adjudication always has been to give "concrete meaning and
expression to values embodied in an authoritative legal text."'286
He recognizes, however, the emergence "within recent decades
[of] a new form of constitutional adjudication" aimed at restruc-
turing "organizations that threaten [public] values. 12 87
These developments in procedural theory provide the basis
for the reformulated values framework offered in the next
section.
IV. A Reformulated Values Framework for Evaluating
Efficiency Procedural Reforms-Recognizing the Value of
Accessible Courts for Minorities Asserting "Marginal" Rights
Claims
As discussed, the emphasis of recent procedural reforms
on economic efficiency has tended to obscure other procedural
values. Cost reduction reforms have focused inquiry narrowly
on whether claims are meritorious under prevailing substantive
law. The implicit message is that meritorious claims belong in
the system; those that appear likely to fail do not. Hence, pro-
cedural reform has been aimed at pre-entry and pre-trial screen-
ing. This singular emphasis, however, ignores or at least tri-
vializes other procedural values. It tends to ignore several of
the traditional values discussed earlier. More important, it ex-
cludes consideration of procedural values of particular relevance
to minorities asserting marginal substantive rights claims.
21S ee Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 211. Eskridge has formulated a useful
definition of public values. They are "legal norms and principles that form fundamental
underlying precepts of our polity-background norms that contribute to and result from
the moral development of our political community. Public values appeal to conceptions
of justice and the common good." Eskridge, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 278,
at 1008.
16 Fiss, Foundations of Adjudication, infra note 346. Sources of public values are
authoritative texts (the Constitution and statutes) and "interpretative communities." The
latter is comprised of the legal community (judges, lawyers, and legal scholars) and a
host of other nonlegal communities (politicians, educators, workers, and clergy, among
others).
27 Id. at 121.
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Theoretical developments in rights analysis and feminist
philosophy2 8 have stimulated inquiry into the process of rights
assertion by historically disadvantaged social groups. That in-
quiry, set in the context of developments in procedural theory
just discussed and minority litigation experience, has suggested
additional or reformulated procedural values linked to court
,access.289 This section endeavors to cast these procedural values
in a framework that facilitates a more complete evaluation of
efficiency reforms. This framework encompasses the values of
empowerment, including autonomy, community-building, and
group mobilization; communication of group voice and the ne-
gotiation and renegotiation of public values; effectuation of the
separation of powers ideal in the context of majority and mi-
nority group relations; and the quest for decency. While other
values can be identified, 290 this section discusses only those that
' See K. Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy (1984) (observing
that bureaucratic structures reflect the dominant/subordinate power relationship of men
and women and arguing that bureaucracy should be replaced by an organization system
based upon women's perceptions and skills); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs, J. Women Culture & Soc'y 635
(1983); Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A
Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M.L. Rev. 613, 624-28 (1986)
[hereinafter Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence] (a feminist critique of Rawls, arguing that
human nature encompasses group harmony and cooperative, supportive goals, and not
selfish, individually-motivated behavior); Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that
Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 819 (arguing that women's
experiences in traditional family roles allow them to approach governance in other social
roles from a family-oriented perspective, rather than an individually-based one); Schnei-
der, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women's Movement,
61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589 (1986) (urging that rights discourse only be used as one element
to affirm collective identity, and that true social change must rely upon a dialectical
sensibility of rights and politics).
ms Some recent scholarship might be criticized for assuming that similar values of
rights assertion extend across all types of claims and cases. See, e.g., Scales-Trent,
Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 9, 42 (1989) (in an insightful essay, generalizing broadly about the
effect of rights assertion for African-American women). Different situations implicate
values of litigation process differently-some directly, some not at all. Thus the discus-
sion in this section does not argue that all cases, or even all minority rights claims,
implicate in meaningful fashion the values discussed.
The values discussed are linked intensely to at least one particular category of
minority filings-minority rights claims directly affected by efficiency-based procedural
reform. As discussed, values of process are particularly significant amidst political
dissonance about rights when minorities assert claims deemed marginal by substantive
law but which nevertheless reflect developing minority group concerns about fairness
and equality.
m For example, although the discretionary structure of procedural rules may allow
for subtly biased exercises of power, formal procedure does tend to constrain clear
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assist in the evaluation of recent efficiency reforms and their
impact upon court access.
A. Procedure and Empowerment: Personal Autonomy,
Community-Building and Group Mobilization
Litigation of some rights claims contributes to the empow-
erment of subjugated groups.2 1 Stigmatized social groups often
lack not only immediate access to political power, but the in-
ternal cohesion and strength to organize and develop group
voice. Procedure hospitable to minority rights claims is one
important aspect of a process for developing internal group
strength and external group power. One can think of this em-
powerment value as comprised of three related aspects: personal
autonomy; community-building; and group mobilization. 292
1. Autonomy
Recent inquiry into concepts of personal autonomy suggests
that the "self is not a natural entity independent of social rela-
tions, but, rather, is created through social practices, or dis-
abuses of government authority by judges and limit overt expressions of bias by private
parties, See Kennedy & Minow, Thurgood Marshall and Procedural Law: Lawyer's
Lawyer, Judge's Judge, 6 Harv. BlackLetter J. 95, 99 (1989) ("respect for procedural
rules, independent of their substantive impact in a given case, can guard against abuses
committed by officials in the name of the law"); see also Delgado, Risk of Prejudice,
supra note 93 (examining the value of formal litigation procedure for minority claimants).
2"I "Empowerment" is an apt term because minorities, by general definition, lack
the power of those in the mainstream whose actions and perceptions often determine
how minorities are labeled and treated. See Scales-Trent, supra note 289; Schneider,
supra note 288, at 625, 642; Williams, supra note 59, at 431.
192 Of course, these aspects of empowerment are not realized in all cases of rights
assertion. Some observers note that rights litigation tends to create an artificial sense
of community that is mistaken for genuine community. See Gabel, The Phenomenology
of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563,
1577 (1984) (cautioning about the illusion of genuine community created by temporary
political coalitions). Others point to a tendency of rights litigation to destroy collective-
ness, creating conflicts that increase the gap between courts and minorities and between
mainstream and minority litigants. Still others see rights litigation as diverting limited
minority capital away from political arenas where it might be most productively ex-
pended. See, e.g., Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984). These
dimensions to rights assertion are viewed as enervating rather than empowering. They
point to the dual potential of rights assertion, which is discussed in infra notes 358-388
and accompanying text.
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courses. 293 Courts open to minorities can contribute to the
development of personal autonomy. For some people, the act
of publicly asserting the entitlement to be taken seriously en-
hances a sense of self-worth. 294 For others, it means transfor-
mation from being solely "other-concerned" to also being self-
concerned.2 95 For still others, rights assertion helps overcome a
sense of privatization and subordination.296 Through rights as-
sertion, 297 the "'private' and 'public' worlds become inextricably
linked. ' 298 Viewed in these ways, the enhancement of personal
autonomy through litigation is rooted in the traditional value of
individual dignity.
2. Community-Building
A developing view of minority litigation is that the process
of asserting rights both enhances personal autonomy and creates
context for sharing common struggles. It links "the individual
to a broader social group," providing strength from a collective
identity.2 99 Karst theorizes that collective identification through
litigation empowers minorities in two ways. It allows the mi-
nority individual to turn "inward to the cultural group" to alle-
viate isolation and also to "use the group identity to participate
11 Trubek, Sociology of Civil Procedure, supra note 92, at 119.
24 See Delgado, The Ethereat Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want?, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 304 (1987) [hereinafter Delgado,
Ethereal Scholar] ("The experience of rights assertion [can be] one of both solidarity
and freedom, of empowerment of an internal and very personal sort; it [can be] a
process of finding the self"); Williams, supra note 59, at 414.
29 See C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice 149 (1982) (rights assertion by women
reorients self-conception to include importance of personal needs and contributes to
moral development).
29 Schneider, supra note 288, at 613-18. Traditional constitutional doctrine over
the last 30 years has recognized dignity concerns of minorities. One theory justifying
heightened standards of judicial review is that minority groups have been unfairly
stigmatized by dominant groups and are therefore especially susceptible to governmental
mistreatment. See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 23.
I" See MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory, 7 Signs, J. Women Culture & Soc'y
515, 519 (1982) (rights assertion as a method of consciousness-raising and as a theory
of social change for women).
298 Schneider, supra note 288, at 602, 603 ("The idea of consciousness-raising as a
method of analysis suggests an approach to social change which recognizes dynamic
tension, reflection, and sharing as essential aspects of growth.").
29 Id. at 617-18.
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in the institutions of [the] wider society. ' '300 For Dworkin, the
moral aspirations of rights claimants also engender a community
of principle.30 1
Whether derived from shared contexts or common aspira-
tions, some minorities experience rights as "invigorating cloaks
of safety that unite us in a common bond. '30 2 That common
bond is an extension of the individual's dignity interest. 30 3 Tra-
ditionally, dignity is viewed with the individual as its referent.
Victims of subordination find power in uniting to fight their
oppressors. Each act of rights assertion brings a measure of
personal dignity to the individual who feels aggrieved by pow-
erful institutions. 304 Each accords the group a sense of power
through the individual's resistance to institutional subjugation.
Many members of the Filipino community believed that
Fragante was asserting not only his own grievance, but also
those of other Filipinos excluded from employment due to their
accents. Litigation was the only means available to compel the
City of Honolulu to respond formally and to account for its
practices. Group dignity and power accrued from a sense of
having an avenue of potential recourse. 305
3. Mobilization of Group Activity
Enhanced personal autonomy and intensified community
bonds arising from rights assertion foster individual participation
300 Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L.
Rev. 303, 337-38 (1986). See also Scales-Trent, supra note 289, at 15, 41-43. Minow
describes a cultural dualism:
Although members of minority groups have historically felt an obligation to
become conversant in the world view of the majority, they have also made an
effort to preserve their own. Minority group members and their sympathizers
alike celebrate these experiences in bilingualism and biculturalism as a strategy
of resistance and as a method for exposing the workings of power.
Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 59, at 69. See also Minow, Interpreting Rights:
An Essay For Robert Cover, 96 Yale L.J. 1860, 1874 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Inter-
preting Rights] ("those claiming rights implicitly invest themselves in a larger commu-
nity, even in the act of seeking to change it").301 R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 212 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, Law's Empire].
301 Delgado, Ethereal Scholar, supra note 294, at 306-07.
303 Michelman, supra note 224, at 1172.
314 See, e.g., Chalk v. United States District Court for Central District of California,
No. 87-6418 (C.D.. Cal. Feb. 28, 1988) (issuing preliminary injunction restoring public
school teacher with AIDS to classroom).
301 Honolulu Star-Bulletin, July 18, 1989, p. 1, col. 4.
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in group effort. Public law litigation often entails group repre-
sentatives litigating in an effort to restructure social and gov-
ernment institutions. Group support is essential.
Political organizing skills emerge through rights assertion
that are useful in other arenas. 306 Elizabeth Schneider has ob-
served that equal rights and reproductive rights claims "ad-
vanced the political development and organizing potential of the
[women's) movement, and expanded and concretized the con-
sciousness of feminist activists and litigators. ' 30 7 Citing litigation
involving the Pregnancy Discrimination Act3 8 as an example,
Schneider notes that it "clarified and heightened the debates
within the movement itself and then turned insights back into
theory. ' '309
Values of individual dignity and participation are trans-
formed into collective identification and community bonding
that facilitate group organization and group participation. Per-
ceptions of procedural fairness are enhanced, fostering citizen
assent. Efficiency procedural reforms that privatize the dispute
resolution process and otherwise discourage court access for
marginal claimants undermine these empowerment values in the
very situations in which they are most compelling.
B. Procedure and the Communication of Group Voice:
A Forum for Negotiation of Public Values
Minority litigation experience suggests a transformed ex-
ternal participation value: making a subordinated group's voice
heard by those more powerful.310 Courts sometimes serve as
306 Schneider, supra note 288, at 629, 640, 647-48.
"Id. at 640.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
30 Schneider, supra note 288, at 640-41.
310 Federal courts and to a lesser extent state courts have provided minorities an
important avenue of political participation.
For nearly two hundred years of this nation's history, few Blacks, Hispanics
or Asian-Americans, to name only a few victims of oppression, would have
thought of taking their claims to court; they knew they would receive no hearing
there. But today, the expectations of the disadvantaged, as well as the sensi-
tivity of our society to their plight, have been heightened. Discrimination and
second-class treatment will no longer be patiently endured, quietly tolerated.
The victims of racism, sexism, and poverty, the aged, the physically and
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forums for raising public awareness of nonmainstream
perspectives.
The Supreme Court has recognized the value of litigation
discourse, noting that a lawsuit can be a "vehicle for effective
political expression . . . , as well as a means of communicating
useful information to the public. '311 That value extends beyond
a formal soapbox for venting.3 12 Rights assertion triggers the
exertion of state power, bringing parties into a fixed forum and
laying a foundation for potential minority participation in ne-
gotiations about public values.
Particularly for minorities asserting marginal claims chal-
lenging the legitimacy of social understandings reflected in sub-
stantive law, accessible courts are potential forums for recasting
the terms and tenor of mainstream discourse and focusing at-
tention on the professed objectivity of those with decisional
power. 3 It enables the powerless to weaken the monopoly over
language and mainstream thought maintained by the powerful. 314
Recent scholarship exposes the link between political and
economic power, on the one hand, and the production of certain
mentally disabled are demanding that they be heard, and they are increasingly
turning to the courts to demand redress of fundamental injustice.
Brennan, Address, 6 U. Haw. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1984) (quoting an address by David Bazelon,
Sr., circuit judge, commencement, University of Washington School of Law (June 11,
1983)). Kathy Ferguson views the assertion of rights by women "as a means of active
participation in public life." Ferguson, supra note 288.
3" In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978). See also Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 552 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). ("In our
present society many important social issues become entangled ... in litigation. Certain
civil suits may be instigated for the very purpose of gaining information for the public
... .Civil litigation in general often exposes the need for governmental action or
correction").
312 Minority perspectives are communicated through the legal process to the public
in at least three general ways. First, group members spread the message about the
litigation and its issues to one another and to an expanding circle of interested others
through word of mouth, newsletters, meetings and demonstrations. Second, if the
litigation appears controversial and the message can be packaged attractively, the news
media will present a minority's views. Finally, the court's decision and opinion become
recorded history. The court's articulation and treatment of minorities' perspectives may
have significant effect. It may recognize the legitimacy of those views or it may devalue
them. In either event the court is likely to reveal value judgments that will serve as a
basis for future discourse.
313 Recent empirical research concludes that disputes and participants are often
transformed by the process of rights assertion. Each stage of the process (naming a
wrong, blaming someone, and claiming relief) is socially constructive and the dispute
is recast at each stage. See Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 631 (1980-81).
34 Mashaw, supra note 61.
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kinds of language, on the other.315 What people in powerful
positions say are real differences between people often justifies
legal rules mandating differential treatment of those less pow-
erful. These statements of difference also influence what the
public perceives as real differences.
Courts provide a forum for public examination of state-
ments and assumptions about difference, entertaining rights
claims not as immutable objects but as "processes of commu-
nication and meaning-making. ' 316 Minow calls for "settings in
which to engage in the clash of realities that breaks us out of
settled and complacent meanings and creates opportunities for
insight and growth. '31 7 Participation in the legal process can
provide a formal public setting that facilitates a "clash of reali-
ties,' 318 sometimes leading to a "dialogue through which we
315 "Dominant cultural expressions of what is different and what is normal" are
influenced by those with power to "construct legal rules and social arrangements."
Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 59, at 33. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpre-
tation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982); White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts
of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1985).
316 Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 300, at 1862.
317 Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 59, at 95. "Law, particularly as admin-
istered in the courts, provides apparent mechanisms for orchestrating competing points
of view. With law as the battleground, we must ask: will courts reinforce the illusion
of one reality, or devise ways to take minority perspectives seriously?" Id. at 69.
318 Minow describes five "powerful unstated assumptions" about "whoge point of
view matters, and about what is given and what is mutable in the world." Justice
Engendered, supra note 59, at 13. These assumptions are called into question when
minorities assert new rights or novel theories challenging existing social arrangements
and prevailing legal principles. The first assumption is that "'differences' are intrinsic,
rather than . . . expressions of comparisons between people." Id. at 32. This means
that difference is an objective state that is to be discovered, and not an expression of a
relationship between the person naming the difference and the person named. The
second is that the assessment of others is often made from an "unstated point of
reference" that is assumed to be "neutral." This unstated point of comparison, however,
is "not neutral, but particular," and a "notion of equality that demands disregarding a
'difference' calls for assimilation" to that unstated norm. Id.
The third assumption is that people treat the "perspective of the person doing the
seeing or judging as objective, rather than as subjective." This assumes that people with
decisional power view matters objectively with even-handed consideration of all inter-
ests. The fourth assumption is that the "perspective of those being judged are either
irrelevant or already taken into account through the perspective of the judge." Id. at
33. The fifth assumption is that "existing social and economic arrangements are natural
and neutral." This presumes that people are "free to form their own preferences and
act upon them" and that "any departure from the status quo risks non-neutrality and
interference with free choice." Id.
Minow rejects these assumptions and offers "alternative starting points" that are
rooted in Supreme Court opinions:
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remake the normative endowment that shapes current under-
standings." 19
What are the dynamics of this dialogue? Many situations
probably are more monologic than dialogic. Those more pow-
erful listen but do not hear. Some situations produce mainstream
backlash. 320 Others enable minorities and open-minded decision-
makers to find common ground that reveals the incompleteness
and impropriety of mainstream views about minorities. 21 Re-
luctant decisionmakers might be impelled to confront the inter-
nal conflict they experience, arising out of their belief in fairness
and equality in principle and acceptance of unfairness and in-
equality in fact.3 22 Conflict generated by rights claims and height-
ened by the media and community groups might push decision-
makers towards negotiation. At a minimum, rights claims
"structure attention even for the claimant who is much less
powerful than the authorities" and for groups "treated through-
out the community as less than equal. 3 23
Feminists have challenged the statements and assumptions
of female inferiority underlying many judicial and administrative
decisions by expanding shared context and by creating internal
or external dissonance. In conjunction with developments in
Difference is relational, not intrinsic. who or what should be taken as the point
of reference for defining differences is debatable. There is no single, superior
perspective for judging questions of difference. No perspective asserted to
produce 'the truth' is objective, but rather will obscure the power of the person
attributing a difference while excluding important competing perspectives. So-
cial arrangements can be changed: maintaining the status quo is not neutral
and cannot be justified by the claim that everyone has freely chosen it.
Id.
319 Id. at 95.
310 The English Only movement, manifested in state constitutional amendments and
legislation, can be seen as an example of majority reaction to the emergence of minority
views and the recognition of minority rights. See generally Note, "Official English":
Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100 Harv. L. Rev.
1345 (1987).
321 Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 300, at 1881 (rights discourse affirms a
"community dedicated to invigorating words with power to restrain ... a community
that acknowledges and admits historic uses of power to exclude, deny, and silence-
and commits itself to enabling suppressed points of view to be heard, to make covert
conflict overt").
322 See Delgado, Ethereal Scholar, supra note 294, at 317.
31 Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 300, at 1879. Minow acknowledges the
"risk that those points of view that have been silenced in the past will continue to go
unheard, and will be least adaptable to the vocabulary of pre-existing claims." Id. at
1880.
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literature, science and social science, repeated use of legal for-
ums contributed to recasting the terms of political debate about
women's capabilities and social roles. This use of legal forums
has revealed dominant perceptions of female inferiority mea-
sured by implicit reference to unstated amorphous male norms.
Legal challenges have highlighted demeaning actions by sexist
legislators, administrators and private entities that have been
supported by court decisions. These challenges have rejected
the legitimacy of such actions and court decisions, not just
because these actions and decisions were adverse but because
they were based on critically false assumptions.
The boundaries to acceptable employer and employee re-
lations, for example, have been redefined in part by litigation
over sexual harassment. 324 Similarly, discourse about justifica-
tions foi wives killing their husbands has evolved from the
traditional self-defense doctrine that required immediate threat
of violence to the oppressiveness and abusiveness of the
relationship. 325
For Fragante, the courts served as a forum for publicly
examining deeply rooted but generally unacknowledged as-
sumptions resulting in limited employment opportunities for
people with foreign accents. He challenged government admin-
istrators' reliance upon their preference not to hear accented
speech as the basis for finding him unqualified for a job he was
otherwise well qualified to perform. By so doing, he questioned
the use of mainstream preferences as the sole referent for de-
termining the "right" of outsiders to benefit from societal
opportunities.
The Fragante trial was the centerpiece of Fragante's efforts
to communicate his views publicly. Media coverage of the trial
transformed the constitution of those "adjudicating" the case.
Those judging the city's practices and explanations were no
longer only people in the courtroom and Fragante's immediate
supporters. Rather, a segment of the wider public participated.
324 C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979) (establishing a
framework for and urging recognition of a claim for sexual harassment). See generally
Schneider, supra note 288, at 643.
35 Schneider, supra note 288, at 606-09 (discussing the philosophy and litigation
strategy of lawyers and activists in transforming the traditional self-defense argument).
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The trial enabled Fragante to communicate with others who felt
individually powerless to address discrimination based on un-
challenged assumptions about group relations. As discussed,
had efficiency procedural reforms been firmly in place in 1983,
there probably would have been no Fragante litigation.
C. Procedure and Persistence: The Continual Renegotiation
of Public Values
Minorities' attempts to challenge mainstream assumptions
about difference have resulted and will continue to result in
protracted political battles. In those situations, repeated asser-
tions of rights through litigation can help focus issues by com-
pelling formal public statements of justification by those with
decisionmaking power. Repeated challenges may transform so-
cial concerns into recognized rights, thereby recharging political
movements. Prominent examples include the Korematsu, Hir-
abayashi, and Yasui coram nobis cases, which rekindled the
reparations movement for Japanese-American internees. 326
Procedures hospitable to the assertion of marginal public
law claims contribute to the process of continual renegotiation
of public values. While a dissertation of sociological and political
theories on the dynamics of law and social structural change is
beyond the scope of this Article, a useful overview is offered
by Mather. She asserts that judicial outcomes at any one time
provide "tentative resolutions to conflicts, but [that] policy ...
continue[s] to be fashioned and refashioned through succeeding
elections, administrative orders, [and] lawsuits. '327 This is con-
sistent with a view of judicially declared principles as dynamic
rather than static, as influenced by myriad shifting social, eco-
nomic and political forces as well as by process constraints.
Many declared judicial principles disfavor the disadvan-
taged. 328 Some that appear to be favorable are later weakened
326 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
327 Mather, The Mobilizing Potential of Class Actions, 57 Ind. L.J. 451, 454 (1982).
31 Eskridge observes that recent Supreme Court public values analysis, in the
context of statutory interpretation, reveals a bias for the powerful over the powerless.
Traditionally subjugated groups come out losers. Eskridge, Statutory Interpretation,
supra note 278, at 1088-89. While this provides a jolt to any romanticized view of the
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by judicial interpretation. Some principles are cast so broadly
that they provide little meaningful guidance for day-to-day pub-
lic behavior. Some legal arguments reinterpreting notions of
appropriate social relations never prevail. Some rights claims,
however, are rejected by courts as untenable, if not outlandish,
until "developing lines of legal or social thought" make them
acceptable. 329 Central to the renegotiation process is the oppor-
tunity of those affected to participate meaningfully.330
One key to meaningful participation is an accessible judi-
ciary. Its heart is a procedural system that values "the process
by which hurts that once were whispered or unheard.., become
claims, and claims that once were unsuccessful, . . . persuade
... others and transform.., social life. ' '331 Repeated assertions
in court of rights that "dislodge and disturb existing patterns of
power"332 are means for those without effective access to elec-
tive or bureacratic power of participating in and sometimes
reshaping the larger social dialogue over time.
Social movements for gender333 and racial equality, in par-
ticular, have benefitted from a procedural system tolerant of
value of minority rights assertion, it does not undercut the thesis that rights litigation
can be valuable for minorities even when their rights claims fail, even when the im-
mediate outcome of public values analysis hurts.329 Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 43, at 437. As a court of appealsjudge, former Chief Justice Burger characterized an argument about circumstancesjustifying an indigent's right to counsel during a lineup as a "Disneyland contention...
bizarre... absurd ... nonsensical." Williams v. United States, 345 F.2d 733, 736-37
(D.C. Cir. 1965). In a later case, the Supreme Court adopted essentially that Disneyland
position in recognizing an expanded right to counsel for indigents. United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Risinger describes the process: "Today's frivolity may be
tomorrow's law, and the law often grows by an organic process in which a concept is
conceived, then derided as absurd (and clearly not the law), then accepted as theoret-
ically tenable (though still not the law), then accepted as the law." Risinger, Striking
Problems, supra note 100, at 57.
330 See generally Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, supra note 239.
3 Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 300, at 1867.
332 Minow, Listening, supra note 251, at 952.
333 Initially, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provided no
protection for women against sex-based discrimination. States continued to pass and
courts continued to uphold sex-based classifications that reflected traditional sexual
stereotypes.
The first notable challenge to sex-based classifications was Bradwell v. Ilinois, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). Relying upon a then expansive construction of the privileges
and immunities clause, Bradwell challenged the Illinois legislature's refusal to allow
licensure of qualified female lawyers. Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, rejected
Bradwell's position, observing:
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repeated rights claims.334 Recent efficiency reforms discourage
such repeated assertions of rights and reopening of cases tried
and failed. Had efficiency reforms been in place, there probably
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of
civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things.
Id. at 141-42.
This assumption about the incompetence and role of women in society permeated
the Court's decisions for almost a century. It justified differential, and usually demean-
ing, treatment of women. Repeated challenges to this assumption as the basis for
governmental action failed. They nevertheless helped keep key issues alive. As women
obtained the right to vote and entered colleges and workplaces in substantial numbers,
these challenges and a slowly evolving social view of women and ethnic minorities
produced erratic statements of principle by the Court. In the early 1960's, the Court
rejected the presumption that a wife acts under the influence of her husband, stating
that this "implies a view of American womanhood offensive to the ethos of our society"
and disregards the "vast changes in the status of woman-the extension of her rights
and correlative duties." United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 53-54 (1960). No important
doctrinal statement emerged, however, and the very next year the Court contradicted
itself and upheld a state's differential treatment of prospective male and female jurors.
Rejecting the argument that independent judicial scrutiny was appropriate, the Court
deferred to state legislative judgment that women belonged at home rather than in a
jury box, noting that "despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restric-
tions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community
life formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the center of
the home and family life." Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961).
Women's consciousness and recognition of historical sex discrimination heightened
in the 1960's. Demands for equality were strongly asserted: equal pay for equal work,
equal access to schools and professions, and prevention of sexual harassment on the
job. Two important Supreme Court decisions reflected that growing concern and estab-
lished principles encouraging future challenges to discriminatory government action.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), for the first time offered some remedy for sex
discrimination. The Court accepted in spirit if not in literal terms Reed's argument that
the minimum rationality test for discriminatory legislation should be abandoned in favor
of heightened judicial scrutiny. Two years later a plurality of the Court in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1971), acknowledged that gender, like classifications based
upon race, alienage and national origin, is "inherently suspect and must therefore be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at 682. Justice Brennan, citing Bradwell, noted
that "there can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of
'romantic paternalism,' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in
a cage." Id. at 684.
Repeated assertions of women's rights to equal treatment failed in the courts until
broadly developing lines of social and political thought heightened acknowledgment of
historical discrimination against women and the role of law in perpetuating the pernicious
effects of that discrimination. Although the social effect of the Court's recent articulation
of principle is difficult to assess, it seems safe to conclude that repeated litigation about
the effects of sex discrimination contributed to the women's movement's progress
toward equality and sharing of power.
334 This sweeping observation is explained in infra notes 358-388 and accompanying
text by a general description of protracted racial integration litigation.
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would have been no timely reopening of Korematsu. There
would have been no public examination of and formal govern-
ment response to Korematsu's charge of the government's fab-
ricated basis for the internment, no court ruling supporting the
reparations effort, and less debate about the continuing danger
of judicial deference to the government's claims of national
security as the basis for restricting fundamental liberties of
citizens .335
Would the litigation of Brown v. Board of Education336 have
been inhibited or limited by efficiency reforms? The Supreme
Court in Brown rejected the separate-but-equal doctrine as it
applied to public schools and held that racial segregation in the
schools violated the equal protection clause. Brown's attorneys
from the NAACP directly challenged the social understandings
underlying the separate-but-equal doctrine, arguing that segre-
gated schools were "inherently unequal." Segregation itself pro-
duced harmful effects. 337
The attorneys cast their argument in the context of a novel
characterization of minority rights. The right was to race-neutral
assignment and that right belonged to every student. The argu-
ment changed the reference point from white students and the
harm they might suffer as a result of integration to all students
and the harm they would suffer from continued segregation.3 38
The NAACP had not committed itself to this legal theory
until Brown was argued before the Supreme Court. 33 9 Out of the
civil rights agitation of the late 1940's and early 1950's emerged
a view that separate could never be truly equal and that equality
335 Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note 4.
336 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
337 Arguing from the vantage point of both black and white students, the attorneys
offered the research of sociologists, anthropologists, psychiatrists and psychologists as
support. Id. at 494 n.ll.
338 See R. Kluger, Simple Justice 543-81 (1975) (describing the development of the
legal theory in Brown).
339 Carter, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregation, 86 Mich. L. Rev.
1083, 1089 (1988). Thurgood Marshall and the other NAACP attorneys approached early
desegregation cases by arguing in the alternative. They argued, first, that the black
schools involved were in fact unequal to white schools, and, second, that in any event,
segregated schools were per se unequal. Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to
Achieve Racial Integration in Education Through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. of Negro
Educ. 316 (1952); see also Rule 11 in the Constitutional Case, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev.
788, 811 (1988).
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in fact was a moral imperative. Brown followed a series of rights
challenges to racial discrimination in public schools, many un-
successful, 340 which wrestled with the translation of moral and
political concerns into legal theory. Just six years before Brown,
the Supreme Court rejected outright the basic argument that it
embraced in Brown.3 4t Federal court procedure facilitated that
translation by accepting a series of rights claims located beyond
the boundaries of prevailing law.
Brown's authoritative statement of public values was im-
mediately extended beyond the realm of public education. The
civil rights movement, encouraged by Brown, also attacked ov-
ert discrimination in housing, jobs and public facilities3 42 and
contributed to a reorientation of mainstream public
consciousness .343
340 For various failed challenges to segregation, see Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S.
78 (1927) (denial of Chinese American student's admission into school for whites); Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (Kentucky statute mandating statewide school
segregation); Cummings v. Board of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (closure of black high
school); Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948); Carr v. Coming, 182 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir.
1950). Cf. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents
for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 639 (1950) (invalidating segregation in two public schools
as unequal under the circumstances, but without directly undermining the separate-but-
equal doctrine).
ml See Fisher, 333 U.S. 147.
312 See Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (municipal auditoriums); Johnson v.
Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courtroom seating areas); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369
U.S. 350 (1962) (airport restaurants); State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533
(1959) (athletic events); New Orleans Park Improvement Assoc. v. Detiege, 358 U.S.
54 (1958) (public parks and golf courses); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses);
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of
Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bathhouses); Muir v.
Louisville Park Theatrical Assoc., 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (parks).
313 Charles Lawrence has described the "cultural meaning" of segregation that
Brown communicated. Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 23 (describing the
cultural message conveyed by segregation that African-American children were inferior
and unfit as schoolmates for white children). A sanguine view of Brown and its impact
has been challenged. Derrick Bell, through his powerful fable, specifies the charges.
See D. Bell, And We Are Not Saved (1988) [hereinafter Bell, Not Saved]. One charge
is that Brown represented less a landmark victory for racial minorities than an illusory
gain for African-Americans and an accommodation of society's dominant economic and
political interests. Lewis Steele, an NAACP attorney, wrote in 1958 that Brown's
mandate of "all deliberate speed" for the integration of schools was nothing more than
a license for continued discrimination. See id. at 61 (quoting Steele). Others argued that
Brown would not "have been possible without the world pressure of communism"
because it was "simply impossible for the United States to continue to lead a 'Freed
World' with race segregation kept legal over a third of its territory." Id. at 62.
Another charge is that Brown is less than meets the eye, that for all its sound and
fury little of value has changed. See Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law:A CriticalReview
in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 96 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). One contention,
1990] Efficiency's Threat to Court Access for Minorities 417
The debate about racial justice continues among groups
with divergent interests. There are more participants now than
during the pre-Brown era. One reason is a procedural system
tolerant of persistent challenges to legal principles and social
understandings. Open court access has contributed to a reshap-
ing of the parameters of the debate so that it now encompasses
minority voices previously silent.
D. Procedure and the Separation of Powers Ideal
The importance of these voices to the renegotiation of pub-
lic values is underscored by the separation of powers ideal. The
lack of minority group opportunity to participate in legislative
or executive processes and the impracticability of forming influ-
ential coalitions with other minorities, places those asserting
marginal rights claims outside of these political decisionmaking
processes and subjects them to the will of majorities. The lack
of opportunity for stigmatized minorities to participate mean-
ingfully in governmental processes justifies heightened judicial
scrutiny under the separation of powers ideal. Even in situations
where the legislative process has responded generally to prob-
lems of discrimination and provided a scheme for protection of
minority interests, e.g., the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a minority
individual's rights under that scheme are enforced through liti-
gation. The legislative process yields benefits only to the extent
that minorities are assured direct participation through the
courts to compel compliance by recalcitrant bureaucrats and
private persons.
Diminished minority access to the courts resulting from
efficiency reform thus exacerbates the problem heightened ju-
addressed specifically to educational enhancement for African-Americans, is that inte-
gration has not improved the quality of education. See Lawrence, supra. The last 10
years have been characterized as a time of stagnation and retrenchment. Social and
political conditions may be better than they were in 1954 for some but not all minorities,
and racism persists. See Jaynes & Williams, A Common Destiny: Blacks and American
Society (1989).
Criticism that Brown as a precedent resulted in far less than initially predicted is
accurate. Criticism that the cloak of omnipotence draped over Brown by some is an
illusion is also apt. Recognizing Brown's limitations as legal precedent, however, need
not obscure its significance in the process of public values articulation.
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dicial scrutiny is supposed to address. Diminished access re-
duces minority participation in a judicial process designed to
rectify the lack of effective minority participation in overtly
political processes. 344
As discussed, traditional values analysis provides only a
limited response to utility theory's question: why be concerned
about minority perceptions of unfairness generated by efficiency
reforms as long as the majority experiences enhanced percep-
tions of fairness? The separation of powers ideal provides a
powerful response. Diminished minority participation in the pro-
cess of negotiating public values strikes at the heart of the
structure of American society and its system of governance.
One role of the judiciary is to'provide a formal forum in which
to address disputes about group interests and public values
arising out of severe imbalances in power among social groups.
Diminished minority access to judicial forums for negotiating
public values threatens that separation of powers ideal.
E. Procedure and the Quest for Decency
In addition to their importance to the process of negotiating
public values, public law adjudication in general and minority
rights assertion in particular are valuable to society because
they tend to be aspirational. They focus attention on the human
condition. They highlight values of equality, liberty, due process
and privacy that transcend property and economic interests and
individual concerns.3 45 These values "stand as the core of a
public morality. '346
34 What constitutes a lack of meaningful minority participation in overtly political
processes? Some minority groups have greater political influence on mainstream deci-
sionmakers than others. And what constitutes meaningful rather than token participa-
tion? A plurality of the Supreme Court recently addressed this question in Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 443-44.
345
It was the determination of black men and women to be truly free that
transformed the Constitution from a document speaking rights as the main
means of protecting property and privilege into an instrument in which the
concept of rights has gained a humane purpose and significance for even those
who lack property, and for whites as well as blacks.
Bell, Not Saved, supra note 343, at 252.
346 Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 L. & Hum. Behav.
121 (1982) [hereinafter Fiss, Foundations of Adjudication].
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In seeking to reconceptualize appropriate institutional be-
havior, litigants asserting rights endeavor to "create a new status
quo, one that will be more nearly in accord with our constitu-
tional ideals. '347 Opinions diverge wildly about what our ideals
are and ought to be. Challenges through litigation continue to
focus debate on those questions.
Minorities have demanded reinterpretation of ideals
through litigation in the context of schools, public facilities,
institutions for the mentally ill and retarded, housing, prisons
and public assistance programs. Rights assertion by minorities
can thus be viewed as an integral and concrete part of a process
of transforming dominant visions of community and society.348
As such, rights assertion also is a discomforting symbol of our
continuing quest for human decency. 349 Laurence Tribe has iden-
tified an antisubjugation principle that aims "to break down the
legally created or legally reenforced systems of subordination
that treat some people as second-class citizens."350 The "core
value of this principle is that all people are of equal worth. 35'
The goal of equal protection "is (or should be) not to stamp out
impure thoughts, but to guarantee a full measure of human
dignity for all. ' 352 An implicit message is that society's moral
fabric is strengthened by concern about decent treatment of its
least advantaged and that society is strengthened to the extent
people recognize a common humanity and move towards accep-
tance of the equal worth of all people and towards the rejection
of group relations characterized by dominance and
subservience.
Some argue that the law has failed to convey that message
effectively. Discrimination persists. Open hostility towards mi-
norities appears to be on the rise. Courts seem less inclined to
discourage oppressive acts by powerful majorities directed at
347 Id. at 124.
3's See Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 Harv. L. Rev. 985 (1990) (describing a need for concrete
mechanisms to transform theories of reconstituted community into social action).
349 Other views might be that many minorities are simply attempting to gain a share
of society's resources, or that rights assertion is a means of getting even with those
more powerful.
350 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1515 (2d ed. 1988).
351 Id.
352 Id. at 1516.
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minorities.35 3 There is substance to these observations. Others
acknowledge the limitations of rights litigation but maintain a
more salutary view of rights assertion in the context of pro-
tracted political efforts. Bell puts it eloquently: "[L]itigation as
well as protests and political efforts [should] pursue reform
directly as well as create continuing tension between what you
are and what you might become. '354 Out of this tension "may
come the insight and imagination necessary to recast the na-
tion's guiding principles closer to the ideal-for all
Americans."35
F. Summary
This section evaluated the cumulative effects of efficiency
reforms according to nontraditional procedural values. Tradi-
tional procedural values analysis provided the foundation. De-
velopments in procedural theory, however, recasted and ex-
panded traditional values analysis to acknowledge group
relations characterized by domination and subordinance, to
challenge the myth of the inherent neutrality and fairness of
procedure, to recognize the empowerment potential of fights
litigation, and to acknowledge the function of procedure in the
articulation of public values. The reformulated values frame-
work just described identified values relating to court access
especially for minorities asserting marginal rights claims. This
Article has suggested that these values are integral to a humane,
functioning legal system in a society committed to democratic
principles.
Recent reforms in civil procedure threaten to undermine
these essential values in two significant respects. First, and most
important, the reforms foster efficiency in part by discouraging
court access for plaintiffs asserting fights claims at the margins
of prevailing law. Second, the reforms accept and encourage the
privatization of dispute resolution as a means of cutting litigation
costs. Minorities challenging mainstream social understandings
ostensibly justifying harsh legal arrangements pay an inordi-
53 See supra notes 11-15.
34 Bell, Not Saved, supra note 343, at 255.
355 Id.
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nately high price for the system's efficiency benefits. Their ac-
cess to formal public forums to compel serious responses by
those in power on issues of public import is curtailed.
In these respects, efficiency procedural reforms collide with
the separation of powers ideal and undermine values of empow-
erment and participation in the development of public values.
They also trivialize the value of court access in cases such as
Korematsu and Fragante. They evince a yearning for less com-
plicated, less burdensome litigation aimed at restoring rather
than unsettling the status quo-a yearning that is in many ways
"blind to social context. 356 Judgments critical to the design and
operation of recent reforms dismiss as uncompelling the con-
tinuing interplay of the political, social, and economic forces
that enliven the values of accessible courts for minorities.357
V. Rights, Politics and Procedure: Concluding Thoughts
Why should minorities and society care about changes in
civil procedure? If courts are narrowing substantive rights,
should not minorities abandon the judiciary as a vehicle of
356 Id. at 170. Efficiency reform tends to assume a wishful view of social and political
institutions: a "complacent, simplistic assumption that American society consist[s] of
happy, private actors maximizing their valid human wants while sharing their profound
belief in institutional competencies." Mensch, supra note 218, at 30. Mensch's statement
addressed faulty assumptions of legal process theory and is equally applicable to the
assumptions of recent procedural reform.
117 Although executive efforts to shrink regulatory bureaucracies have partially
succeeded, public endorsement of government regulation in areas of health, safety and
environment remains strong. Where regulation is ineffective, as in the Alaskan oil spill
and clean-up debacle, litigation may be an essential option for harmed individuals and
groups. And corruption within agencies such as the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, whose mandate is to assist the disadvantaged, underscores the need to
keep government accountable.
Fair distribution of entitlements remains a function of government. Cutbacks in
program funding and eligibility criteria continue to generate disputes of individual and
group significance. People with tenuous claims under revised criteria may ultimately
receive nothing. Nevertheless, they should not be deterred from challenging what they
believe to be bureaucratic mistakes with serious personal consequences.
The civil rights landscape shows marks of increasing turmoil. Executive conser-
vatism, Supreme Court retrenchment, conservative political activism and extremist
violence collectively are sending minorities an unmistakable message: enough has been
too much. As institutions reinterpret and narrow the scope of minority rights, the need
for forums to organize and communicate intensifies.
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progress?358 Indeed, Cover suggested that public values might
be most productively developed outside the judicial arena.359
This Article's specific response to the question of why mi-
norities should be concerned lies in the values of minority rights
assertion developed in the preceding section. That response is
located generally within an emerging jurisprudence of rights,
politics, and community. The debate about rights continues.
358 The federal courts have grown markedly more conservative in their procedural
as well as substantive rulings on public law issues. Note, All the President's Men?: A
Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 Colum. L.
Rev. 766 (1987). Ronald Reagan appointed one third of the Supreme Court justices and
over one half of the federal district and circuit court judges. Reagan's judicial appoint-
ments campaign promoted candidates likely to rule conservatively. Schwartz has char-
acterized former President Reagan's judicial appointments as a "campaign to turn the
clock back" on civil rights and transform "American life and law." Schwartz, Packing
the Courts-The Conservative Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution (1988) (Schwartz'
analysis has been criticized as suffering from an "excess of zeal" and as the work of an
"advocate". Lauter, Packing the Courts-The Conservative Campaign to Rewrite the
Constitution (Book Review), 74 A.B.A. J. 124, 124-25 (1988)). Indeed, recent qualitative
and quantitative studies indicate that Reagan appointees are more conservative on civil
liberties issues than their Republican colleagues appointed by Presidents Nixon and
Ford. Note, All the President's Men, supra, at 776-77. These studies also demonstrate
unequivocally that Republican-appointed judges are overwhelmingly more conservative
in their substantive rulings on public interest issues than Democrat-appointed judges.
They also use procedural devices to defeat public interest positions with twice the
frequency. Id. at 778.
"Hostility" to civil rights statutes and decisions expressed quietly through "technical
and procedural outlets" reflects a masking approach that, according to some, emanates
from the top. Sanders, Chipping Away At Civil Rights, Time, June 26, 1989, at 66
(quoting Professor Eleanor Holmes Norton). The approach has been attributed to the
Burger Court and, with increasing intensity, to the Rehnquist Court. Chayes, Role of
the Judge, supra note 44, at 1305 ("One suspects that at bottom [the Burger Court's)
procedural stance betokens a lack of sympathy with substantive results and with the
idea of the district courts as vehicles of social and economic reform"). See also Tribe,
Constitutional Choices, supra note 48 (describing proposed legislation limiting federal
court jurisdiction over certain types of public law disputes).
Consistent with the administration's efforts to recast the judiciary, Professor Ca-
plan's study reveals an effort by the Reagan Administration to reform the Solicitor
General's role from solicitor on behalf of the country to zealous advocate of the
president's social agenda. L. Caplan, The Tenth Justice-The Solicitor General and the
Rule of Law (1987) (quoting Rex Lee, former Solicitor General during the Reagan
Administration: "There has been this notion that my job is to press the Administration's
policies at every turn and announce true conservative principles through the pages of
my briefs. It is not. I'm the Solicitor General, not the Pamphleteer General."). See also
Wilson, Constraints of Power: The Constitutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork,
Posner, Easterbrook and Winter, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 1171 (1986).
3-19 Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1983) (describing the development and effectuation of normative
commitments by small communities removed from or in opposition to sources of state
authority ("jurtgenesis") and the fragmenting or destructive nature of judicial process
("juripathic")).
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Conservative theorists perceive undue judicial expansion of
rights. Rights have been created without authoritative bases,
and rights litigation has promoted social conflict and dishar-
mony.360 Liberal theorists have endeavored to locate legitimate
bases of rights, implicitly accepting the legal system's capacity
to produce just outcomes and engender social progress. 361 Crit-
ical theorists have criticized liberal rights theory as divorced
from political and social context. 362 At the extreme, rights are
viewed as formalistic, individualistic, and indeterminate. 363
Rights and the judicial system serve to perpetuate society's
unequal power relationships, and their deceptive promise of
equality and liberty enervates political movements. 364
160 See generally The Federalist Soc'y, The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written
Constitution (1986).
36 To generalize broadly, overlooking many differences in perspectives, liberal
rights theorists accept realism's rejection of formalism and its acknowledgment of
difficult judicial value choices in the formulation and application of legal principles.
They nevertheless believe that it is both desirable and possible to generate normative
principles of justice that are general enough to engender consensus and specific enough
to constrain discretion. See, e.g., Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 301 (judges
should endeavor to identify legal principles that are consistent with case precedent and
community values and that comport with normative concepts of political morality); R.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1979).
32 There is no one critical theory approach, and any attempt at generalization risks
oversimplification. In broad outline, critical theory has attempted to shift the focus of
legal argument. It is skeptical of the law's claim to "correct answers," and "true
interpretations" reflecting "society's morals." It rejects liberal theorists' normative ar-
guments that focus on abstract consensus values and neutral decisional procedures. It
views this approach as disassociated from political reality and essentially a return to
formalism that masks hard judicial value choices about competing societal interests.
Thus critical theory rejects "traditional sources of norms such as the market system,
the pluralist tradition, and classical liberalism." Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Crit-
ical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1987) [here-
inafter Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom]. Law is viewed as a belief structure or "system
of meaning" constructed by people to deal with problems of social existence. For an
insightful comparison of liberal and critical theories see Singer, supra note 75, at 467.
3 Those with power to construct the system can, if unchecked, wield the law
"neutrally," Gordon, New Developments In Legal Theory, in The Politics of Law: A
Progressive Critique 286 (D. Kairys ed. 1982), to perpetuate unequal and unfair social
and economic relationships. See generally Kennedy, Form & Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Peller, The Politics of Reconstruction, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1985); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 561 (1983).
"Rights legitimize society's unfair power arrangements, acting like pressure valves
to allow only so much injustice. With much fanfare, the powerful periodically distribute
rights as proof that the system is fair and just, and then quietly deny rights through
narrow construction, nonenforcement, or delay." Delgado, Ethereal Scholar, supra note
294, at 304 (summarizing and criticizing Critical Legal Studies). See generally Bell, Not
Saved, supra note 343, at 174.
31 Strident criticism of critical theory and CLS in particular has been voiced from
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An emerging perspective rejects conservative theory's nar-
row focus on authoritative texts, acknowledges the limitations
of liberal rights theory,36 and recognizes the potential impedi-
ment in some instances of rights litigation and discourse to social
progress. This perspective also recognizes, however, distinct
values for minorities engaged in continued litigation and dis-
course about rights.3 66
Matsuda has noted minorities' dichotomous views of law
arising out of minority litigation experiences. Minorities have
experienced the influence exercised by powerful economic and
political interests upon judicial decisions. In a social milieu
tolerant of biased attitudes and discriminatory acts, judicial out-
comes tend to denigrate minority interests.3 67 Minorities also
have "passionately invoked legal doctrine, legal ideals, and lib-
without and within. Common criticism of CLS is that it reduces law to the personal
predilections of judges. It is non-normative, "non-programmatic, over-idealized, inac-
cessible, cynical, anti-rational, and nihilistic." See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom,
supra note 363, at 349 (reciting common criticism).
Fiss sees CLS, along with law and economics, as two movements that "endanger
the proudest and noblest ambitions of the law" and that "distort the purposes of law
and threaten its very existence." Fiss, The Death of The Law?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1
(1988). He views CLS as endeavoring to "unmask the law, but not to make law into an
effective instrument of good public policy or equity." Id. at 10. He contrasts the
approach with that of feminist and realist theorists who "are moved by an affirmative
vision.., if not liberty, then a true and substantive equality" and who "appreciate how
the law can be used to further that vision." Id. at 9.
361 The most poignant criticism is that Rawls' theory assumes a single view of
human nature, of individuals committed primarily to the attainment of individual ends.
Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence, supra note 288, at 624-25. The influences of culture
and social environment are purposely but unrealistically ignored behind the "veil of
ignorance." Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 59, at 60 n.240. Highly abstract
principles derived from a single "universal" vantage point are not in fact universal and
are misleading in assuming nonexistence of other legitimate views.
Another criticism is that Rawls' principles embody the conundrum of rights anal-
ysis. Minorities have a right not to be treated differently to their disadvantage by
majorities because everyone deserves equal treatment. At the same time minorities have
a right to favorable treatment in certain respects because historical mistreatment by the
majority has placed them in a position of continuing disadvantage. Id. at 60.
366 Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 59, at 19 n.37. See Schneider, supra
note 288, at 590 (the dialectical perspective posits a "dynamic inter-relationship of rights
and politics, as well as the dual and contradictory potential of rights discourse to blunt
and advance political development").
367 Atticus Finch's moving defense of a black man falsely accused of sexually
assaulting a southern white woman in To Kill A Mockingbird, in which he demands
unsuccessfully that the jury rise above its prejudice, is a dramatic illustration. H. Lee,
To Kill a Mockingbird (1960). For a discussion of moral implications, see Shaffer,
Christian Lawyer Stories and American Legal Ethics, 33 Mercer L. Rev. 877, 879
(1982).
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eral theory in the struggle against" discrimination and have
succeeded partially due to the "passionate response that con-
ventional legalism can at times elicit." 368
Can the embrace and the distrust coexist? Matsuda suggests
that they can and do, that "minority experience of dual con-
sciousness accommodates both the idea of legal indeterminacy
as well as the core belief in a liberating law that transcends
indeterminacy. '369 Responding to the "charge from the right that
rights promote conflict rather than community" 370 and to the
charge from the "left that rights reinforce individualism at the
expense of community," scholars are forging a view of rights
assertion that encompasses "debate over legal and political
choices without pretending a social harmony that does not exist
and without foreclosing social changes as yet unimagined."3 71
This view in important respects draws upon and extends a
communicative theory of law. Jurgen Habermas describes mod-
em societies as plural, marked by unequal distributions of
power, wealth and status, whose laws and legal institutions are
undergoing a "legitimation crisis. ' 372 A communicative theory
of law links legitimacy to actual discourse in decisionmaking
according to democratic principles, deriving the political legiti-
macy of substantive legal norms in significant part from the
democratic attributes of the process generating them. 373 Strict
368 Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 362.
369 Id. at 341.
370 For example, some CLS scholarship, with its deconstruction or "trashing" of
rights, see Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293 (1984), is criticized as insensitive to
minority experiences and the significance of rights assertions for minorities. Williams
frames the general approach in her rejection of one CLS position on the detrimental
effect of rights assertion by minorities:
The goal is to find a political mechanism that can confront the denial of need.
The argument that rights are dilute, even harmful, trivializes this aspect of
black experience specifically as well as that of any person or group whose
genuine vulnerability has been protected by that measure of actual entitlement
which rights provide.
Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 59, at 413. See also Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom, supra note 362; Schneider, supra note 288.
371 Minowi Interpreting Rights, supra note 300, at 1862. See, e.g., P. Chevigny,
More Speech: Dialogue Rights and Modem Liberty (1988); Schneider, supra note 288.
372 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, supra note 239.
373 See J. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action (T. McCarthy trans. 1987);
Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, supra note 239; T. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of
Jurgen Habermas (1978). Jean Cohen describes the core tenets of the discourse ethic in
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procedures govern the process. Equality of access to and par-
ticipation in the forums for decisionmaking are key. All those
affected by the norms must have "an effective chance to assume
dialogue roles. ' 374 This means that the dialogue "must be a fully
public communicative process unconstrained by political or eco-
nomic force," anyone potentially affected "may participate in
the discussion on equal terms" and each participant can "shift
the level of the discourse." 75
A problem with this vision is that contemporary political
and cultural institutions tend to undermine effective participa-
tion in the political dialogue about rights.376 Access to elective
and bureaucratic decisionmaking forums is blocked for some
and others with initial access lack clout to shape or alter the
terms of debate. Although courts are by no means immune from
political and economic forces, they do provide potential leverage
to those without power, enabling them to join and participate in
shaping public values. Especially for minorities, courts can as-
sist in the creation of procedural conditions for legitimacy in a
way that ordinary political processes do not. In so doing, they
can contribute to and stimulate the process of "cultural trans-
formation" by encouraging those without established forms of
power or social status to "assemble, associate and articulate
positions publicly on the terrain of civil society. '377
This view of rights assertion and courts tempers theory
with experience and responds to the call for ways in which law
can contribute to the transformation of reconstituted visions of
community into better social conditions. 378 It is a view of rights
terms of process and content. Cohen, supra note 40, at 1394 ("The first specifies the
conditions of the possibility of the discourse leading to a legitimate rational agreement;
the second articulates the possible contents [on a formal level] of such an agreement").
314 McCarthy, supra note 373, at 316.
7 Cohen, supra note 40, at 1395 (digesting the "demanding preconditions" set forth
by Habermas).
376 Cohen observes that "while the principles of formal democracy... are 'freedom
guaranteeing,"' the institutionalization of these freedoms has been "selective at best
and is, today, increasingly bureaucratic." Cohen, supra note 40, at 1405. "The possibility
of participating in public opinion formation and genuine political discourse, and, hence,
of influencing political decisionmaking, is considerably restricted through the segmen-
tation of... the voter's role, competition of elites, vertical opinion formation in party
apparatuses, manipulative techniques of the mass media, and culture industry." Id. at
1405.
37 Id. at 1406.
311 See Cook, supra note 348.
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assertion that was viscerally accepted and strategically adopted
by the Korematsu legal team in filing the coram nobis petition
in 1983. 379 The legal team's analysis of the original Korematsu
litigation led it to believe that the Supreme Court's ruling in
1944 was largely political rather than principled. 30 The team
asserted this in its petition, drawing support from newly discov-
ered World War II government documents that showed key
government decisionmakers' overt reliance on racist stereotypes
and their deliberate effort to mislead the Supreme Court about
military necessity.381 At the same time, the legal team decided
to rely upon the indeterminate and discretionary principle of
fairness embodied in the concept of due process in asking the
same court that had convicted Korematsu forty years earlier to
vacate his conviction. 38 2
Korematsu's attorneys acknowledged the false cultural as-
sumptions and political values at play in the Supreme Court's
1944 decision, recognized the shifting of attitudes towards the
internment and focused on the expanded role of federal courts
in addressing civil liberties. Despite predictions of failure from
many corners, the legal team decided to employ traditional lan-
guage of rights as the mechanism for confronting apparent anti-
civil rights policies of the Reagan Administration, for expanding
the support base for a legislative reparations movement, for
publicly challenging lingering racial stereotypes and for rebuild-
ing the self-image of an ethnic group still suffering from a griev-
ous governmental wrong.383 The legal team adopted political and
social goals beyond the specific outcome of the litigation-goals
directed both inward at the social group and outward toward
the public. The team employed rights assertion as the vehicle. 384
379 Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. 1406.
m See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214. For an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision
in 1944 and the coram nobis litigation in 1983, see Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited,
supra note 4.
3'" That belief was later confirmed by the formal findings of the Congressional
Commission On Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians ("CWRIC") in 1983.
The commission found that the internment was the result of war hysteria, racism and a
failure of political leadership, and not on the basis of any military necessity. Report of
the CWRIC, Personal Justice Denied (1983).
382 See Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note 4, at 2.
381 For further discussion, see Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 362, at
338.
3u Interview with Minami, supra note 1. See also Schneider, supra note 288, at 605
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Korematsu is an extraordinary case in many respects. It is not,
however, an isolated example of dualism in minority legal con-
sciousness or of the communicative value of judicial rights as-
sertion for groups otherwise lacking meaningful access to polit-
ical power.
A sanguine view of rights assertion, drawn from selected
cases, might be criticized, as public values analysis has been
criticized, as "contemporary legal utopianism. ' 385 Korematsu is
an extraordinary case in part because of its unusual outcome.
If in most cases rights are not being recognized, the process of
rights assertion has a "self-deluding quality. ' 38 6 These are
weighty, and troubling, criticisms.
If the view of rights assertion and procedure offered here
were premised on the pluralist model of government decision-
making or if the procedural values associated with minority
rights assertions were linked to visions of voluntary power shar-
ing and a single harmonious interpretive community, then the
criticism would be damning. The view offered, however, rests
on a different foundation. It acknowledges that group relations
are often characterized by an imbalance of power and that dom-
inant groups are unlikely to yield power willingly. It acknowl-
edges that procedure sometimes produces bad substantive re-
sults. 387 It also acknowledges the potential of rights litigation to
("We [at the Center for Constitutional Rights] asserted rights not simply to advance
legal argument or to win a case, but to express the politics, vision, and demands of a
social movement, and to assist in the political self-definition of that movement.").
315 M. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law
162 (1988) (public values analysis lacks content).
316 Eskridge, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 278, at 1091.
317 See Kennedy & Minow, supra note 290, at 97 ("Respect for procedural rules is
perhaps the purest form of respect for the Rule of Law ... [which] demands that the
players be given a chance to choose to obey the rules and to learn to play within
them."). Kennedy and Minow suggest that Justice Marshall, although thoroughly ded-
icated to "pursuing social justice through law," appears to be committed to the inde-
pendent value of procedure, so much so that he "would come to enforce procedural
rules that preclude the outcomes demanded by substantive justice." Id. at 99.
My interpretation of their commentary is that Justice Marshall believes in the need
for a sturdy procedural framework and in the duty of all litigators to master its intricacies
and strategic potential. Justice Marshall's embrace of "proceduralism", however, with
its occasionally harsh substantive results, is probably dependent upon the overall ac-
cessibility and fairness of the system for all who seek to use it, especially minorities.
The Federal Rules, prior to efficiency procedural reform, were perceived by many as
"generally fair" to minorities-that people outside the mainstream tended to be included
rather than excluded from the system. See Weinstein, supra note 186. If the system, as
restructured and implemented, disproportionately and adversely affects certain groups,
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enervate as well as empower, recognizing that the process of
rights assertion is dynamic with conflicting potential. Despite
these complexities and contradictions, and in some ways in light
of them, the view offered here suggests an essential procedural
value of accessible courts for minorities; the value to which the
other more specific procedural values are linked. Minority rights
assertion enables minorities to use judicial power to gain entry
into the polity without "relinquishing struggles over meaning
and power. '388
We especially care about the effects of procedural change
upon minorities for that reason. A procedural system hospitable
to minority claims at the margins facilitates not only the artic-
ulation of old rights in new contexts. It also facilitates the de-
velopment of group power by encouraging the articulation and
advocacy of new conceptions of rights responsive to the needs
and aspirations of people unrecognized by the Constitution's
framers and ignored by society's mainstream.
especially those with little input into its creation and operation, the system may lack
integrity to warrant support. For example, it is doubtful that Marshall would find a
$1,000 filing fee acceptable even if all litigants were required to pay it, the rich as well
as the poor. This returns us to our inquiry about the likely cumulative effects and overall
fairness of recent procedural reforms.
388 Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 300, at 1862.

